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Delaware’s Global Competitiveness
William J. Moon*
ABSTRACT: For about a hundred years, Delaware has been the leading
jurisdiction for corporate law in the United States. The state, which
deliberately embarked on a mission to build a haven for corporate law in the
early twentieth century, now supplies corporate charters to over two thirds of
Fortune 500 companies and a growing share of closely held companies. But
Delaware’s domestic dominance masks the important and yet underexamined
issue of whether Delaware maintains its competitive edge globally.
This Article examines Delaware’s global competitiveness, documenting
Delaware’s surprising weakness competing in the emerging international
market for corporate charters. It does so principally by studying the corporate
law preferences of foreign firms listed in the United States. While Delaware
was once a popular jurisdiction for foreign corporations listing in American
stock markets, it has dramatically fallen out of favor in recent years. This is
particularly true among firms based in China that have recently made their
debut to American investors. For instance, the Cayman Islands is now the
juridical home to over half of Chinese companies listed in American stock
markets, compared to Delaware’s five percent.
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By exploring the paradox of Delaware’s domestic popularity and
international unpopularity, this Article makes three contributions to the
literature. First, it presents data indicating that Delaware’s dominance of the
corporate charter market may be a parochial, American phenomenon. Second,
it develops a theory to explicate why foreign firms operating within vastly
different market environments may be averse to Delaware’s corporate
governance paradigm. Finally, it adds to the corporate law convergence debate,
counseling against blind exporting of Delaware corporate law to foreign
nations.
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INTRODUCTION

It would appear that Delaware has it all—at least to American corporate
law junkies. Heralded “as the de facto national corporate law [maker],”1 the
state’s renowned Delaware Court of Chancery is celebrated as “America’s
premier corporate court.”2 In recent years, Delaware has cemented its status
as the leading jurisdiction for corporate law in the United States,3 serving as
juridical home to over two thirds of Fortune 500 companies.4 Some have
called the competition over, declaring that Delaware has won the race
between states to supply corporate charters.5 Others assess that Delaware is an
effective “monopoly,”6 with the state erecting an insurmountable barrier to
entry for other states competing in the market for corporate law.
But legal scholars have principally studied Delaware’s dominance in
terms of the state’s magnetic appeal to American corporations,7 thereby
neglecting to consider Delaware’s global competitiveness.8 In reality, a large
number of corporations headquartered in foreign nations can choose to be

1. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58
VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1574 (2005).
2. Mark J. Roe, Juries and the Political Economy of Legal Origin, 35 J. COMPAR. ECON. 294, 294
(2007) [hereinafter Roe, Juries].
3. Corporate law is the law governing the relationship between the firm’s shareholders
(the technical owners of the firm) and managers (directors and officers who operate the firm on
behalf of shareholders). See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 1–3
(1993) [hereinafter ROMANO, GENIUS]. In the United States, this body of law has principally been
left to the states, who compete to supply corporate charters to corporations that can effectively
“shop” for corporate law by incorporating in any state. Id.
4. See About the Division of Corporations, DELEWARE.GOV, https://corp.delaware.gov/
aboutagency [https://perma.cc/UC9C-QEZV]. Delaware has also become the jurisdiction of
choice for closely-held companies. See Jens Dammann & Matthias Schündeln, The Incorporation
Choices of Privately Held Corporations, 27 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 79, 84 (2011); Bruce H. Kobayashi &
Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware for Small Fry: Jurisdictional Competition for Limited Liability Companies,
2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 91, 91 (“[W]e find evidence that large LLCs, like large corporations, tend to
form in Delaware, and that they do so for many of the same reasons—that is, for the quality of
Delaware’s legal system.”).
5. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 590 (2003) (“Delaware
has ‘won’ that race, as most large American firms incorporate there.”).
6. Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1214–15 (2001) [hereinafter Kahan & Kamar, Price Discrimination].
7. The prevailing literature typically studies corporations that are both publicly traded in
American stock markets and incorporated in one of the constituent states of the United States.
See, e.g., Marcel Kahan, The Demand for Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility, Judicial Quality, or Takeover
Protection?, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 340, 348 (2006).
8. See William J. Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1403, 1407 (2020)
[hereinafter Moon, Delaware’s New Competition]; Omari Scott Simmons, Delaware’s Global Threat,
41 J. CORP. L. 217, 221 (2015) (“Although scholars have addressed the impact of globalization
on securities regulation, the parallel impact on Delaware’s role, as a de facto national regulator,
remains largely underdeveloped.”) [hereinafter Simmons, Delaware’s Global Threat].
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governed by Delaware corporate law, simply by incorporating in Delaware.9
This is particularly true for a growing number of foreign companies raising
capital in American stock markets, who have incentives to choose corporate
law that is most palatable to American investors.10 After all, a corporation’s
place of incorporation determines the applicable corporate law governing a
range of important shareholder rights,11 and thus choosing a jurisdiction that
diminishes those rights is presumably punished by the market in the form of
lowered stock prices.12 But we know little about how important this market is,
who Delaware is competing with, and whether Delaware also dominates this
broader international market for corporate law.13

9. To form a Delaware corporation, a firm need not maintain any physical operation in
Delaware. Instead, it only needs to file paperwork, pay a franchise tax, and hire a registered agent
who has “a physical street address in Delaware.” How to Form a New Business Entity, DELEWARE.GOV,
https://corp.delaware.gov/howtoform.shtml [https://perma.cc/XD6Q-D93G]. Of course, many
jurisdictions around the world forbid local corporations from choosing foreign corporate law.
But there are many major jurisdictions around the world—including Brazil, Canada, China,
India, Israel, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States—that allow their corporations
(formally or informally) to shop for corporate law of any jurisdiction. See infra Section II.B.
10. See Brian Broughman, Jesse M. Fried & Darian Ibrahim, Delaware Law as Lingua Franca:
Theory and Evidence, 57 J.L. & ECON. 865, 866 (2014) (assessing that “a firm wishing to attract
investors from around the country may choose Delaware merely to provide a law that can be
‘spoken’ by all of its investors”). When choosing to list in the New York Stock Exchange or
NASDAQ, foreign corporations subject themselves to a host of rules mandated by federal
securities law. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 922 (1998) (“[U]nder the
current U.S. regime, issuers can only gain access to capital in the United States by complying with
the American securities regime.”). But foreign companies (to the extent that their home
countries enable them to do so) are at liberty to choose the corporate law of any American state
or foreign nation. See, e.g., Solaredge Techs., Inc., Annual Report (Form F-1) 1 (Feb. 19, 2021)
(illustrating an Israeli firm incorporated in Delaware and listed in NASDAQ); Nio, Inc., Annual
Report (Form 20-F) 1 (May 14, 2020) (illustrating a Chinese firm incorporated in the Cayman
Islands and listed the New York Stock Exchange).
11. See Vincent S.J. Buccola, Opportunism and Internal Affairs, 93 TUL. L. REV. 339, 346 (2018).
12. See Ralph K. Winter, Foreword to ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 3, at xi (1993) (assessing
that corporations incorporating in a state that deliberately diminishes shareholders rights “must
pay more for capital”); James J. Park, The Limits of the Right to Sell and the Rise of Federal Corporate
Law, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 159, 160 (2017) (“Because public shareholders can easily sell their shares,
the market will check poor corporate governance.”); Stephen J. Choi, Promoting Issuer Choice in
Securities Regulation, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 815, 826 (2001) (“For companies whose securities trade in
an efficient market, the value of adopted regulatory protections will be incorporated in the
market price.”).
13. Part of this gap stems from the standard account presupposing that corporate law
matters little when foreign firms choose to list in American stock markets. See John C. Coffee, Jr.,
The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications,
93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 699 (1999) [hereinafter Coffee, Future as History] (“This Article has said
little about state corporate law, because it believes that the critical restraints that most limit agency
costs are today contained in the federal securities laws.”). This Article will complicate this
conventional account, showing that corporate law matters, and that foreign firms have acute
preferences for corporate law. See infra Section II.B.
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This Article begins to fill that gap by documenting Delaware’s surprising
weakness competing in the emerging international market for corporate
law.14 Contrary to what conventional wisdom would predict—that capital
thirsty foreign corporations would choose to incorporate in Delaware when
listing in American stock markets to attract American investors15—foreign
corporations are choosing to incorporate in small offshore nations in the
Caribbean. Thus, for instance, when Alibaba (widely regarded as the
“Amazon” or “eBay” of China) listed in the New York Stock Exchange raising
a record-breaking $25 billion in 2014,16 the company chose to incorporate in
the Cayman Islands, rather than Delaware. Alibaba is hardly an unusual
story.17 In 2018, PagSeguro, Brazil’s iconic financial technology firm, raised
the highest amount of capital for a Brazilian company listing in the United

14. This Article is part of a series of projects aimed at uncovering what I believe is an
emerging international market for corporate charters. In a recent paper, I document how a
handful of “offshore corporate law havens”—principally the Cayman Islands, Bermuda, and the
British Virgin Islands—have started to attract publicly traded corporations that are principally
headquartered in the United States. See Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 8, at 1406.
My broader hope is that these projects will help us better understand the global dimensions of
corporate law akin to other fields of law. See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B.
Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 29 (2005);
Tseming Yang & Robert V. Percival, The Emergence of Global Environmental Law, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q.
615, 649 (2009); Jennifer Prah Ruger, Normative Foundations of Global Health Law, 96 GEO. L.J.
423, 434 (2008); Lawrence O. Gostin, Matiangai V.S. Sirleaf & Eric A. Friedman, Global Health
Law: Legal Foundations for Social Justice in Public Health, in FOUNDATIONS OF GLOBAL HEALTH &
HUMAN RIGHTS 45, 47 (Lawrence O. Gostin & Benjamin Mason Meier eds., 2020); Michael P.
Van Alstine, Consensus, Dissensus, and Contractual Obligation Through the Prism of Uniform
International Sales Law, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 36–42 (1996).
15. This theory is most prominently associated with the bonding hypothesis, developed in
Professor Jack Coffee’s celebrated work. In broad strokes, the theory predicts that firms
voluntarily bind themselves to higher disclosure regimes mandated by established capital markets
like the United States in order to “enhance their share price and become able to raise additional
equity at lower cost.” John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and
Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1763 (2002)
[hereinafter Coffee, Racing Towards the Top].
16. Liana B. Baker, Jessica Toonkel & Ryan Vlastelica, Alibaba Surges 38 Percent on
Massive Demand in Market Debut, REUTERS (Sept. 19, 2014, 12:40 AM), https://www.reuters.com
/article/us-alibaba-ipo/alibaba-surges-38-percent-on-massive-demand-in-market-debut-idUSKBN0
HD2CO20140919 [https://perma.cc/RHF9-T2RN] (“The pricing of the IPO on Thursday
initially raised $21.8 billion for Alibaba. Scott Cutler, head of the New York Stock Exchange’s
global listing business, told CNBC that underwriters would exercise their option for an additional
48 million shares, to bring the IPO’s size to about $25 billion, making it the largest initial public
offering in history.”).
17. Because of their importance to the general trend, this Article focuses on Chinese
companies listed in American stock markets. But there are a number of other examples where
foreign corporations raising capital in the United States choose non-Delaware jurisdictions. For
instance, Jumia, widely regarded as the “Amazon” of Africa, recently made its debut in the New
York Stock Exchange incorporating in Germany. See Jumia Techs. AG, Registration Statement
(Form F-1) 9 (Mar. 12, 2019) (identifying the place of incorporation as Berlin, Germany).
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States—after incorporating not in Delaware or Brazil, but in the Cayman
Islands.18
While Delaware was once a popular jurisdiction for foreign corporations
listing in American stock markets, it has dramatically fallen out of favor in
recent years.19 This is particularly true among the army of giant corporations
headquartered in China that have recently made their debut to American
investors. As documented below, the Cayman Islands is now home to over 50
percent of Chinese companies listed in American stock markets, compared to
Delaware’s 4.9 percent.20 This is no accident. In recent years, companies like
Sohu.com and China Biologic Products have spent millions of dollars hiring
elite American law firms to change its legal domicile from Delaware to the
Cayman Islands.21
This trend is particularly perplexing given Delaware’s preeminent status
in the corporate law ecosystem.22 In addition to being widely considered the
gold standard among American legal scholars and practitioners alike, it
has served as a model template for a number of foreign nations enacting
corporate law reforms.23 There is also a well-developed body of empirical
research documenting why firms incorporate in Delaware. Professor Roberta
Romano, for instance, has produced an extensive set of empirical evidence
demonstrating that Delaware maintains a firm-value-enhancing set of
corporate governance rules.24
18. Investor Relations, PAGSAGURO, http://investors.pagseguro.com/ir-home [https://perma.cc/
5DHU-X3LJ] (describing the company’s initial public offering in the New York Stock Exchange
in 2018 as the “[l]argest Brazilian IPO in the US, totaling 2.6bn dollars”).
19. See infra Table 1 (showing that Delaware’s market share of foreign firms listed in the
United States has declined from 29.5 percent in 1985 to 11.2 percent in 2018).
20. See infra Table 2.
21. For instance, China Biologic Company, a major biopharmaceutical company
specializing in blood plasma in China, hired Davis Polk to redomicile from Delaware to the
Cayman Islands in 2017. See China Biologic Products Redomicile from Delaware to the Cayman Islands,
DAVIS POLK (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.davispolk.com/news/china-biologic-products-redomiciledelaware-cayman-islands [https://perma.cc/LQ37-GZY2] (“Davis Polk advised China Biologic
Products, Inc., a NASDAQ-listed company, in connection with its change of domicile from
Delaware to the Cayman Islands . . . .”).
22. See, e.g., Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets
Reality, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 393, 426 (2003) (“Delaware . . . is widely recognized as the most
significant jurisdiction for corporate-law purposes . . . .”). But see Robert Anderson IV & Jeffrey
Manns, The Delaware Delusion, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (2015) (“Corporate lawyers routinely
embrace the widespread, yet unproven assumption that Delaware’s corporate governance
framework is better than that of other states and steer their clients towards Delaware.”).
23. See infra Section IV.B. The Republic of the Marshall Islands, for instance, has statutorily
adopted Delaware corporate law (including the state’s judicial precedents) as the law of the Republic.
See Business Corporations Act 1990, tit. 52, ch. 1, § 13, https://rmiparliament.org/cms/images/
LEGISLATION/PRINCIPAL/1990/1990-0091/BusinessCorporationsAct1990_4.pdf [https://
perma.cc/HSC4-RLU6] (Marshall Islands).
24. Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 225, 279 (1985) [hereinafter Romano, Law as a Product] (“Delaware is not only the choice
of firms reincorporating to undertake transactions with increased litigation potential, but even
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Of course, it is possible that foreign corporations are flocking to the
Cayman Islands or the British Virgin Islands for tax reasons. These offshore
jurisdictions, after all, have been identified in both popular media and various
academic circles as some of the most notorious “tax havens” in the world.25
Current federal tax code, indeed, subjects all foreign companies incorporated
in the United States to federal tax, even if they physically operate entirely
outside of the United States.26 Perhaps the promised tax reduction is so great
that foreign firms are willing to opt into “suboptimal” Cayman law, even
though they would have preferred Delaware law.27
But tax is at best only a partial explanation.28 If tax were the only reason
(or even the principal reason), one would predict that firms incorporated
offshore would contractually specify Delaware-type corporate governance rules
in their corporate bylaws or corporate charters. After all, popular offshore
jurisdictions like the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands impose
fewer mandatory rules than Delaware,29 meaning that firms incorporated in
those jurisdictions can choose to contractually provide higher (Delawarelevel) protection for shareholders. And we know that corporate “[b]oards and
shareholders [today] are increasingly using charter and bylaw provisions to

more important, the firms that migrated to Delaware perceived the difference in the laws of their
origin and destination states to be a major factor in their decision to relocate.”). Professor Robert
Daines, moreover, has produced data indicating that Delaware corporate law not only improves
firm value but also “facilitates the sale of public firms.” Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve
Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 525 (2001); see also id. at 533 (illustrating that Delaware law
enhances shareholder value by as much as five percent of the value of the firm). Of course, not
everyone agrees that Delaware corporate law enhances firm value. See Lucian Bebchuk, Alma
Cohen & Allen Ferrell, Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CALIF. L. REV.
1775, 1777 (2002) (“[R]eported findings of a positive correlation between incorporation in
Delaware and increased shareholder wealth are not robust and, furthermore, do not establish
causation.”).
25. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, RE-IMAGINING OFFSHORE FINANCE: MARKETDOMINANT SMALL JURISDICTIONS IN A GLOBALIZING FINANCIAL WORLD 3–5 (2016); RONEN PALAN,
RICHARD MURPHY & CHRISTIAN CHAVAGNEUX, TAX HAVENS: HOW GLOBALIZATION REALLY WORKS
27, 124 (2010); GABRIEL ZUCMAN, THE HIDDEN WEALTH OF NATIONS: THE SCOURGE OF TAX
HAVENS 27–28 (Teresa Lavender Fagan trans., 2015).
26. Under Section 7874 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, corporations with no presence
in the United States may be treated as U.S. corporations for U.S. federal income tax purposes by
virtue of incorporating in the United States. See 26 U.S.C. § 7874 (2018); see also Douglas Chiu,
Note, Inversion Subversion: Corporate Inversions and the New Federal Laws Against Them, 20 FORDHAM
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 717, 723 (2015) (“[T]he corporation is considered domestic for taxation
purposes so long as it is incorporated in or under the jurisdiction of the United States.”).
27. Cf. Mitchell A. Kane & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Taxation and International Charter
Competition, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1231 (2008) (“[C]orporate tax consequences of migration
can make the cost of choosing the desired corporate law prohibitive. In this way, corporate tax
can trap firms in a suboptimal jurisdiction from the standpoint of corporate law.”).
28. See infra Section III.A.
29. See Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 8, at 1444–49; see also E. EDWARD
SIEMENS, OFFSHORE COMPANY LAW 9 (2009) (noting that the British Virgin Islands and the
Cayman Islands are “preeminen[t] in the offshore world”).
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customize their corporate governance.”30 But this Article’s extensive handcollected study of Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) disclosures
documented in Section III.A reveals that foreign firms listed in American
stock markets are largely choosing to opt out of rules that are mandatory
under Delaware law.31
In documenting Delaware’s paradoxical position in the increasingly
globalized market for corporate law, this Article develops a theory of territorial
market segmentation to explain why firms operating in different market
environments might prefer different types of corporate governance rules.
This account, which builds on prevailing theories that assess that different
types of corporations may have differentiated taste for corporate law,32
explains why firms principally operating in certain foreign markets may be
averse to Delaware corporate law. Thus, for instance, if a corporation operates
predominantly in China—where self-dealing transactions are routine,
tolerated by local authorities, and constitute an important strategy to compete
in certain sectors33—that corporation would be averse to Delaware law, where
self-dealing transactions would open the floodgate to costly shareholder
litigation in the United States.34
The theory of territorial market segmentation offers a number of
intellectual and practical payoffs. First, it adds to the debate on whether
corporate law will globally converge. More specifically, it complicates
Professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman’s provocative and widely30. Jill E. Fisch, Governance by Contract: The Implications for Corporate Bylaws, 106 CALIF. L. REV.
373, 373 (2018) [hereinafter Fisch, Corporate Bylaws].
31. See infra Section III.A. It is also important to note that even if a particular firm’s
incorporation decision is purely motivated by tax, shareholders and managers of that company
are opting into a legal regime that may have vast consequences for shareholder rights.
32. The idea that firms may have differentiated preferences for corporate law was originally
hinted at by Judge Richard Posner and the late Professor Kenneth Scott in a book published four
decades ago. See RICHARD A. POSNER & KENNETH E. SCOTT, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW
AND SECURITIES REGULATION 111 (1980). The idea that firms shop for corporate law owes its
intellectual debt to Professor Roberta Romano’s influential works conceptualizing corporate law
as “products.” See Romano, Law as a Product, supra note 24, at 226–27. Since then, the concept of
market segmentation has been expressly developed by Professor Michal Barzuza in her study of
Nevada attracting firms that prefer manager-friendly corporate law. See Michal Barzuza, Market
Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a Liability-Free Jurisdiction, 98 VA. L. REV. 935, 935–36 (2012)
[hereinafter Barzuza, Nevada].
33. As further discussed in Section III.C, Chinese firms exhibit a vastly different
organizational structure than their counterparts in the United States. According to Professors
Raymond Fisman and Yongxiang Wang, “[m]ost large Chinese firms belong[] to a business
group.” Raymond Fisman & Yongxiang Wang, Trading Favors Within Chinese Business Groups, 100
AM. ECON. REV. 429, 430 (2010). The firms operating within large corporate groups, therefore,
engage in intra-group transactions as a natural result of “operating as one enterprise in the form
of a corporate group.” Kon Sik Kim, Related Party Transactions in East Asia, in THE LAW AND
FINANCE OF RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS 285, 304 (Luca Enriques & Tobias H. Tröger eds.,
2019) [hereinafter Kim, Related].
34. See Jessica M. Erickson, Overlitigating Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Examination, 97 IOWA
L. REV. 49, 86 (2011).
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cited thesis that argues that corporate governance rules will globally converge
to shareholder-centric governance rules.35 To Hansmann and Kraakman,
global convergence of corporate law to Delaware-style governance rules is
almost assured by “recent dominance of a shareholder-centered ideology of
corporate law among the business, government, and legal elites in key
commercial jurisdictions.”36 But so long as regulatory laws and market
environments impacting firms remain relatively heterogeneous across
national borders, convergence may not be anywhere on the horizon.
Normatively, the theory of territorial market segmentation challenges
conventional wisdom in some circles that effectively synonymizes “good”
corporate governance rules with Delaware corporate law. Delaware’s failure
to attract foreign corporations raising capital in American stock markets is
important—and underexploited—data indicating that corporate governance
rules codified in Delaware may not be ideal in all market conditions. Thus,
from a policy perspective, territorial market segmentation counsels against
blindly exporting Delaware corporate law to foreign nations.
Several caveats warrant attention. First, Delaware’s weakness in attracting
foreign companies in recent years is not necessarily an indication that the
quality of Delaware corporate law is on the decline. It is entirely plausible that
the drop in Delaware’s overall market share is largely due to the changing
demographics of foreign firms listed in the United States, as opposed to
shifting taste among existing firms. Indeed, the decline appears to be driven
in large parts by the rapid growth in the number of Chinese firms listed in
the United States in the past two decades that predominantly prefer to
incorporate in the Cayman Islands over Delaware.37 Second, this Article’s
findings should not be interpreted as an indication that tax or federal
securities laws do not matter in incorporation choices of public companies.

35. See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law,
89 GEO. L.J. 439, 468 (2001) (arguing that the “triumph of the shareholder-oriented model of
the corporation over its principal competitors is now assured”). This view is already contested,
with leading scholars assessing that path dependency and local interest groups may hinder
corporate law reform in many foreign nations. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A
Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 131 (1999)
(explaining that corporate structures can provide certain groups with more power and influence,
allowing them to adopt more favorable rules in the future); see also JEFFREY N. GORDON & MARK
J. ROE, CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 11 (Jeffrey N. Gordon &
Mark J. Roe eds., 2004) (“[S]tructural imperatives help to explain why differences have persisted
thus far, despite convergence in many economic areas.”). This Article develops a complementary
account, arguing that global convergence is unlikely to happen even as firms are increasingly able
to shop for corporate charters transnationally. See infra Section IV.A.
36. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 35, at 439.
37. See infra Table 2. Relatedly, it supports the idea that firms may only need to provide
adequate protection for investors in certain circumstances. That is, the minimal investor
protection provided by federal securities law, coupled with the widespread perception that
Chinese companies have explosive growth potential, may be enough for investors to overlook the
possibility of self-dealing. These conditions may not universally hold for all foreign companies.
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In some respects, imputing motives on the organizational behavior of juridical
entities is an inherently imprecise task, and tax or federal securities laws may
serve as important co-causal variables under many circumstances. The degrees
of importance of these variables for firms operating in different market
conditions is a subject that would benefit from further research.
The remainder of this Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I synthesizes
the existing literature on the merits (and demerits) of Delaware corporate law
and presents original data documenting Delaware’s surprising weakness in
attracting foreign corporations listed in American stock markets. After
explaining why tax arbitrage opportunities or federal securities law cannot
fully account for why foreign corporations listed in American stock markets
are headed “offshore,” Part II argues that the content of Delaware corporate
law is responsible for foreign corporations actively avoiding Delaware. Part III
develops a theory of territorial market segmentation, assessing that local
regulations and market dynamics influence firm-level corporate law
preferences. It then counsels against foreign nations blindly transplanting
Delaware corporate law. A brief conclusion follows.
II. THE PARADOX OF DELAWARE’S DOMESTIC POPULARITY AND
INTERNATIONAL UNPOPULARITY
American law school casebooks on corporate law are replete with cases
from Delaware—and for good reason. Delaware has been the leading
jurisdiction for corporate law in the United States for about a hundred years,38
and Delaware courts have produced some of the most canonical and
influential cases in corporate law.39 Section II.A. synthesizes existing
scholarship documenting Delaware’s dominance of the American corporate
law market, with leading scholars vigorously disagreeing about the normative
merits of the state’s influence. Section II.B. offers original data documenting
Delaware’s weakness competing in the emerging international market for
corporate law.
A. DELAWARE’S POPULARITY
The central doctrinal bedrock to Delaware’s corporate law empire is
the internal affairs doctrine.40 The doctrine, which is said to have a “quasi38. See Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J. CORP. L.
33, 42 (2006); Joel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware’s General Corporation Law of 1899, 1 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 249, 271 (1976).
39. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Delaware’s Retreat: Exploring Developing Fissures and
Tectonic Shifts in Delaware Corporate Law, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 323, 325 (2018) (“No student emerges
from a law school’s business organization class today without a deep familiarity with these
Delaware precedents.”).
40. See Frederick Tung, Lost in Translation: From U.S. Corporate Charter Competition to Issuer
Choice in International Securities Regulation, 39 GA. L. REV. 525, 542 (2005) (“While each state offers
its own corporation law, states generally accept and apply the so-called internal affairs doctrine
for their choice of law regarding a corporation’s internal affairs—the relations among a firm’s
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constitutional” status under American law,41 instructs that the firm’s place of
incorporation supplies the corporate law that governs the firm’s shareholders
and managers regardless of where the firm physically operates.42 It is for this
reason that a tiny state like Delaware can serve as the juridical home to over
66 percent of Fortune 500 companies and roughly half of all publicly traded
companies in the United States.43
Corporate law is big business in Delaware. Delaware’s state government
derives approximately 17 percent of its government revenues from firms
incorporated in the state.44 Lawmakers in Delaware are not shy about
pronouncing the importance of corporate franchise taxes to the state’s
economy.45 According to an official state government publication, Delaware
has “an uncommonly high share of the cost of government . . . actually paid

shareholders and managers.”). According to the Supreme Court of the United States,
“[t]he internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle which recognizes that only one State
should have the authority to regulate a corporation’s internal affairs—matters peculiar to the
relationships among or between the corporation and its current officers, directors, and
shareholders.” Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982). Today, the doctrine intellectually
rests on the idea that corporate law is a nexus of contracts between voluntary actors coming
together for commercial enterprises. Under this conception, jurisdictions are conceptualized as
suppliers of corporate law “products,” with firms exercising autonomy to incorporate in virtually
any state or foreign nation in the world. See Romano, Law as a Product, supra note 24, at 226–27;
Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 8, at 1418–22 (synthesizing American conflict of
laws jurisprudence enabling American firms to shop for the corporate law of any state or nation
state).
41. Compare Richard M. Buxbaum, Federalism and Company Law, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1163,
1166–78 (1984) (questioning the internal affairs doctrine’s constitutional pedigree), with Paul
N. Cox, The Constitutional “Dynamics” of the Internal Affairs Rule—A Comment on CTS Corporation,
13 J. CORP. L. 317, 349 (1988) (“[T]he internal affairs rule of choice of law may have a
constitutional dimension.”).
42. R. LEA BRILMAYER, JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIN O’HARA O’CONNOR, CONFLICT OF LAWS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 114–15, 127–32 (2015).
43. See Ronald J. Gilson, Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, Regulatory Dualism as a
Development Strategy: Corporate Reform in Brazil, the United States, and the European Union, 63 STAN. L.
REV. 475, 512 (2011) (“Roughly half of all publicly traded U.S. corporations are chartered in
their headquarters state; nearly all the rest are incorporated in Delaware.”); see also Robert Daines,
The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1572 (2002) (finding that nearly 95
percent of firms that incorporate outside of their home state choose Delaware).
44. Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for
Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 212 (2006) (“A substantial portion of Delaware’s tax
revenue—an average of 17% over the past several decades—is derived from incorporation fees.”).
45. Franchise tax is an annual tax that states charge on firms for the privilege of
incorporating in their states. As observed by Professor Barzuza, “[u]nlike some other taxes, the
franchise tax is not a portion of income or revenues.” Michal Barzuza, Does the Structure of the
Franchise Tax Matter?, 96 VA. L. REV. BRIEF 27, 27 (2010).
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by residents of other states,”46 largely because of the state’s “position as the
preferred state of incorporation for corporate America.”47
Delaware works hard to maintain its competitive advantage. The state’s
corporate code is a byproduct “of an unwritten compact between the bar and
the state legislature.”48 It is no secret that Delaware lawmakers regularly rely
“upon the expertise of the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware Bar
Association to recommend, review and draft almost all amendments to the
statute.”49 Its judiciary—particularly the Delaware Court of Chancery—is
famous for being staffed with renowned business law judges who resolve
disputes without juries.50 The large number of corporations that choose to
incorporate in Delaware, in turn, creates network effects: The unusually large
number of corporate lawyers across the United States who are familiar with
Delaware law and the extensive body of case law unavailable in other states
encourage even more firms to incorporate in Delaware.51
The pursuit of corporate franchise taxes, which incentivizes state
lawmakers to craft corporate codes that cater to private sector preferences,
has been famously described as “the genius of American corporate law.”52 This
is the influential “race to the top” account. As Professor Roberta Romano
explains, competition between states results in a race to the top because it
enables firms to “seek the state whose code best matches their needs so as to
minimize their cost of doing business.”53

46. See DEP’T OF FIN., OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CONTROLLER GEN.’S OFF., DELAWARE’S
GENERAL FUND REVENUE PORTFOLIO 22 (2008), https://financefiles.delaware.gov/docs/GP
2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y26Q-WBRC].
47. Id. at 23. Franchise taxes constitute just one piece of the revenue flow. As the legal home
to the largest share of the nation’s corporations, Delaware also receives a substantial share of
“‘owner-unknown’ and ‘address unknown’ property held by businesses incorporated in Delaware
[which] must be remitted to Delaware after the dormancy period has run its course.” Id. at 62.
48. LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 4 (2007).
49. Id. at 4. This group consists of 21 transactional and litigation attorneys representing
small and large law firms in Wilmington, Delaware. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy
Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1755 (2006).
50. Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L.
REV. 542, 590 (1990) (“Delaware’s governor, mindful of the value of corporate charters, often
deliberately appoints judges with corporate experience.”); Roe, Juries, supra note 2, at 294
(“[T]he usual view in legal circles is that the jury’s absence (and the resulting decision-making
by expert judges, not juries) is a strength of the court, not a weakness.”).
51. Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV.
757, 843–45 (1995); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:
Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 586–87 (2002) [hereinafter
Bebchuk & Hamdani, Leisurely Walk]. Closely related to this idea is that Delaware corporate law
has become “a lingua franca” given that “some firms will domicile in Delaware simply to provide
all of their investors with a language that each investor can understand.” Broughman et al., supra
note 10, at 867.
52. ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 3, at 1.
53. Id.
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Of course, Delaware’s dominance of the American corporate law market
has attracted its fair share of criticisms. In an infamous critique of Delaware
corporate law, former SEC chair Bill Cary argued that competition between
states to supply corporate charters induces states to “race for the bottom”
by adopting laws that favor corporate insiders—namely directors and
officers—over dispersed shareholders.54 Modern writers also denounce
Delaware as fattening the pockets of Delaware corporate lawyers, who
purportedly are the main beneficiaries of Wilmington’s corporate law
empire.55
While the race for the bottom thesis continues to enjoy support among
modern American corporate law scholars in various iterations,56 the
documented popularity of Delaware is difficult to explain away as a case of
“managerial interest gone wild” scenario espoused by early race to the bottom
theorists. For one, Delaware remains a fan favorite among institutional
investors,57 who now hold “over half the stock in most American
corporations.”58 This sophisticated breed of shareholders—including
BlackRock and the Vanguard Group—can presumably fend for their own
interests.59 There is also a well-developed body of empirical research
documenting why firms incorporate in Delaware, particularly for large firms

54. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663, 705 (1974) (describing American corporate law as encouraging a “race for the bottom”).
This view built on Justice Brandeis’s concern that a competition between states to produce laws
for corporations would induce state laws to capitulate to private corporate interests over public
interests. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548–65 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
55. See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of
Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987) (exploring how an interest-group theory can
help predict and explain legal rules of corporations chartered in Delaware that have left lawyers
in a dominant position); Douglas M. Branson, Indeterminacy: The Final Ingredient in an Interest Group
Analysis of Corporate Law, 43 VAND. L. REV. 85 (1990) (concurring with Professors Macey and
Miller while expanding on the involved interest groups).
56. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Corporate Charter Competition, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2101, 2104
(2018); Lynn M. LoPucki, Algorithmic Entities, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 887, 890 (2018); Bebchuk
et al., supra note 24, at 1778; Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on
Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the “Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
1795, 1797 (2002); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race
to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1169 (1999).
57. See, e.g., Charles M. Elson, Why Delaware Must Retain Its Corporate Dominance and Why
It May Not, in CAN DELAWARE BE DETHRONED?: EVALUATING DELAWARE’S DOMINANCE OF
CORPORATE LAW 225, 228 (Stephen M. Bainbridge, Iman Anabtawi, Sung Hui Kim & James Park
eds., 2018).
58. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New
Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 689 (2005); see also Scott Hirst, The Case
for Investor Ordering, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 227, 231 (2018) (“[T]he rise of institutional investors
has transformed the ownership of U.S. corporations. Institutional investors, such as investment
managers and pension funds, now invest the overwhelming majority of capital in U.S.
corporations and have the capability to determine corporations’ choice of arrangements.”
(footnote omitted)).
59. See Hirst, supra note 58, at 230–31.
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that go public. Professor Roberta Romano, for instance, teaches us that
Delaware produces a firm-value-enhancing set of corporate governance
rules.60 Professor Robert Daines, moreover, has produced empirical evidence
showing that firms incorporated in Delaware have a higher Tobin’s q (a widely
used measure of management performance) than firms incorporated in
other states.61 It is for this reason that Delaware is almost always the chosen
jurisdiction for corporations that change their legal residence from one state
to another state.62
Unsurprisingly, judicial opinions issued by Delaware courts frequently
serve as persuasive authority or even de facto precedential authority for state
and federal judges across the United States.63 Many state lawmakers have also
enacted corporate codes heavily influenced by Delaware’s approach, if not
outright copying sections of Delaware’s corporate code.64
But legal scholars have studied Delaware’s dominance predominantly
in terms of Delaware competing with other American states, thereby
neglecting to consider Delaware’s appeal to foreign corporations.65 In reality,
a significant cluster of firms that principally operate outside of the United
60. Romano, Law as a Product, supra note 24, at 279 (“I found statistically significant positive
abnormal returns were experienced by firms reincorporating for mergers and acquisitions
purposes.”).
61. See generally Daines, supra note 24 (finding that Delaware law enhances shareholder
value by as much as five percent of the value of the firm). But see Guhan Subramanian, The
Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32, 33 (2004) (assessing that “small Delaware
firms . . . were worth more than small non-Delaware firms during the period 1991–1996, but not
afterwards”); Robert Bartlett & Frank Partnoy, The Misuse of Tobin’s q, 73 VAND. L. REV. 353, 358
–59 (2020) (critiquing the use of Tobin’s q in modern corporate law scholarship assessing that
“[a]s a general matter, Tobin’s q, in any specification, is not a good measure of the value of
corporations, either in theory or in practice”).
62. POSNER & SCOTT, supra note 32, at 102 (“Of the total of 140 switching firms, 126
(90.0%) changed to Delaware and only 6 (4.3%) left Delaware for other states.”).
63. Jens Dammann, Deference to Delaware Corporate Law Precedents and Shareholder
Wealth: An Empirical Analysis 2 (June 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3384446 [https://perma.cc/P2PA-Q88Z].
64. See William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing
Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 57 (observing that “a few states have copied Delaware’s law”);
Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J.
2359, 2392 (1998) (observing that “the vast majority of states copied Delaware’s approach,
permitting charter amendments to eliminate liability”).
65. There are some notable exceptions. Leading comparative corporate law scholars, for
instance, have studied the influence of Delaware’s corporate law jurisprudence in a number of
foreign court proceedings, acknowledging the possibility of Delaware setting the global standard
for foreign nations enacting corporate law reforms. See, e.g., Curtis J. Milhaupt, In the Shadow of
Delaware? The Rise of Hostile Takeovers in Japan, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2171, 2175 (2005). However,
legal scholars have largely left unaddressed Delaware’s international competitiveness as measured
by foreign firms choosing to incorporate in Delaware (as opposed to lobbying for local corporate
law reforms, resulting in transplantation of Delaware’s corporate governance rules). This
untapped data is important because the corporate law preferences of foreign firms—particularly
ones raising capital in the United States—are perhaps the best evidence we have of whether
Delaware corporate law maintains its competitive edge internationally.
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States can choose to be governed by Delaware corporate law—simply by
incorporating in the state, in a process that is essentially “glorified
paperwork.”66 Of particular note are the growing number of foreign
corporations that raise capital in American stock markets, who have reasons
to choose corporate law that is most desirable from the standpoint of
American investors.
The prevailing literature unfortunately overlooks the importance of
corporate law in examining the behavior of foreign firms listed in American
stock markets.67 Leading scholars have long assumed that federal securities law
(which mandatorily kicks in when foreign corporations list in the United
States) sufficiently displaces foreign firms’ home corporate law.68 Professor Jack
Coffee, for instance, has observed that even if foreign corporate law governing
foreign firms deviates from conventional features of American corporate law,
those foreign firms “may be significantly constrained by federal securities
regulation.”69 Instead, scholars have focused on examining why foreign
corporations choose to list in American stock markets, despite the notoriously
burdensome disclosure rules and compliance costs associated with federal
securities law. This is the “bonding hypothesis” developed in Professor
Coffee’s influential pieces. According to Coffee, the simplest explanation for
foreign firms listed in the United States “is that such a listing is a form of

66. See William J. Moon, Tax Havens as Producers of Corporate Law, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1081,
1095 (2018) [hereinafter Moon, Tax Havens].
67. To be sure, this omission was perhaps not as critical in the past as it is today. Several
decades ago, relatively few foreign companies were listed in American stock markets, and these
foreign firms had little reason to consider incorporating in the United States. Many foreign
corporations listed in American stock markets were also either outright prohibited from
incorporating outside of their “home” countries, or faced substantial costs to switch corporate
law. But today, over 14 percent of corporations listed in American stock markets are incorporated
in foreign nations. See Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 8, at 1424–25. A substantial
portion of these new foreign entrants to American stock markets are based in countries like China
that allow their local firms to “shop” for corporate law.
68. In order to reach the deep pockets of American investors, foreign companies listed in
the United States surrender their home country’s securities laws and are largely forced to abide
by federal securities law. Modern federal securities law, in turn, directly impacts substantive areas
traditionally considered to be in the domain of corporate law. See James J. Park, Reassessing the
Distinction Between Corporate and Securities Law, 64 UCLA L. REV. 116, 126–31 (2017); Eric L.
Talley, Corporate Inversions and the Unbundling of Regulatory Competition, 101 VA. L. REV. 1649,
1652–53 (2015) [hereinafter Talley, Inversions] (“During the last fifteen years, a series of
significant regulatory reforms—such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Act
of 2010—have suffused U.S. securities regulations with an unprecedented array of corporate
governance mandates, ranging from board independence requirements to compensation
reforms to internal financial controls to proxy access.” (footnotes omitted)); MARC T. MOORE,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE SHADOW OF THE STATE 203 (2013) (describing how securities
laws “affect corporate governance in ways beyond merely mandating ongoing corporate
transparency”). Foreign corporations listed in American stock exchanges may claim some
exemptions, but are unable to opt out of all of federal securities law once they choose to list in
the United States. See, e.g., Coffee, Racing Towards the Top, supra note 15, at 1821–22.
69. Coffee, Future as History, supra note 13, at 699.
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bonding—a credible and binding commitment by the issuer not to exploit
whatever discretion it enjoys under foreign law to overreach the minority
investor.”70
The bonding hypothesis has gained much traction and empirical support
over the past two decades.71 But the theory only further emboldens the
paradox identified in this Article: If foreign firms bind themselves to federal
securities law to raise capital from American investors, why do they not also
bind themselves to Delaware corporate law? After all, American investors are
most familiar with Delaware corporate law, and a robust body of empirical
work indicates that incorporating in Delaware enhances firm value.
Incorporating in Delaware also gives foreign corporations and their
shareholders access to Delaware’s judicial infrastructure,72 which is said to be
one of the pillars underlying Delaware’s competitive advantage.73 Contrary to
what existing scholarship predicts, recent newspaper headlines suggest the
opposite: Foreign companies, like Sohu.com, have re-incorporated out of
Delaware to the Cayman Islands, often paying millions of dollars in legal fees
to elite American law firms.74
There is a pressing need to examine this paradox. For one, the potential
pool of foreign corporations that are eligible to shop for Delaware law have
sharply increased over the years because a number of major foreign nations
have relaxed legal restrictions that forced corporations to be bound by local
70. Id. at 691. The theory further predicts that “by voluntarily subjecting themselves to the
United States’s higher disclosure standards and greater threat of enforcement (both by public
and private enforcers), they partially compensate for weak protection of minority investors under
their own jurisdictions’ laws and thereby achieve a higher market valuation.” Coffee, Racing
Towards the Top, supra note 15, at 1757.
71. See generally Amir N. Licht, Cross-Listing and Corporate Governance: Bonding or Avoiding?, 4
CHI. J. INT’L L. 141 (2003) (arguing that bonding theory is not supported by evidence versus the
alternative avoiding hypothesis); Edward Rock, Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap: A Credible
Commitment Theory of Mandatory Disclosure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 675 (2002) (arguing that
mandatory disclosures create a mechanism to make a credible commitment device for tapping
into U.S. capital markets); Ugur Lel & Darius P. Miller, International Cross-Listing, Firm Performance,
and Top Management Turnover: A Test of the Bonding Hypothesis, 63 J. FIN. 1897 (2008) (examining
the ability to improve cross-listed firms’ corporate governance by identifying and eliminating
poorly performing CEOs). Relatedly, the “reputational bonding hypothesis” explains that foreign
firms choose to be governed by federal securities law as a reputation building mechanism. See
Jordan Siegel, Can Foreign Firms Bond Themselves Effectively by Renting U.S. Securities Laws?, 75 J. FIN.
ECON. 319, 356 (2004).
72. Delaware courts exercise jurisdiction over corporate law disputes of any business entity
incorporated in the state. See Papendick v. Bosch, 410 A.2d 148, 148 (Del. 1979).
73. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44
UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1017 (1997); Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the
Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1064 (2000) [hereinafter Fisch, Peculiar
Role] (attributing “Delaware’s success in attracting corporate charters” to “the unique lawmaking
function of the Delaware courts”).
74. See, e.g., Lulu Yilun Chen, Sohu Proposal for Tax Haven Opposed by Prominent Proxy Adviser,
BLOOMBERG (May 23, 2018, 4:15 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-23/
sohu-proposal-for-tax-haven-opposed-by-prominent-proxy-adviser [https://perma.cc/J7H6-4MDV].
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corporate law.75 Today, a number of major jurisdictions around the world
allow firms to shop for corporate law, including Brazil,76 Canada,77 China,78
India,79 Israel,80 Japan,81 the United Kingdom,82 and the United States.83 The
number of foreign corporations listed in American stock markets has also
grown by leaps and bounds in recent years,84 and these firms have reason to
choose corporate law that is appealing from the standpoint of American
investors. Particularly noteworthy recent entrants are dozens of mega
technology firms based in China that began tapping U.S. investors in the early

75. The legal restrictions turn on local conflict of laws rules. Doctrinally, restrictions on
local firms opting out of local corporate law are often accomplished through the “real seat”
doctrine, which assigns corporate governance rules based on where the corporation principally
conducts its business. Werner F. Ebke, The “Real Seat” Doctrine in the Conflict of Corporate Laws,
36 INT’L L. 1015, 1016 (2002). Importantly, Europe has begun to abandon the “real seat”
approach, although European Union law only requires member nations to allow local firms to
incorporate in other member nations of the European Union. See Ronald J. Gilson, Henry
Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, Regulatory Dualism as a Development Strategy: Corporate Reform in
Brazil, the United States, and the European Union, 63 STAN. L. REV. 475, 509 (2011) (“Centros allows
a new corporation to incorporate in any EU state, and establish its business in any other EU state,
even though the corporate governance system in the state of incorporation may impose fewer
restrictions than the country in which the business is actually carried out.”).
76. See André Antunes Soares de Camargo, Three Essential Aspects of Corporate Law: A Brief
Overview of Brazilian and American Approaches, 9 SW. J.L. & TRADE AMS. 89, 99–100 (2003).
77. See Douglas J. Cumming & Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, The Rationales Underlying Reincorporation
and Implications for Canadian Corporations, 22 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 277, 279 (2001) (“There are
no residency requirements associated with incorporating in a particular jurisdiction.”); id. at 284
(studying Canadian firms reincorporating in foreign nations).
78. See Serena Y. Shi, Dragon’s House of Cards: Perils of Investing in Variable Interest Entities
Domiciled in the People’s Republic of China and Listed in the United States, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1265,
1266–67 (2014).
79. See Aditi Shrivastava, Queue of Startups Rushing to Register Abroad Gets Longer, ECON.
TIMES (Feb. 12, 2020, 6:34 PM), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/startups/
newsbuzz/queue-of-startups-rushing-to-register-abroad-gets-longer/articleshow/74091926.cms
[https://perma.cc/3NCP-L53M] (“More Indian startups are incorporating their businesses
overseas. Singapore, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the United
Arab Emirates are being preferred.”).
80. See Yael T. Ben-Zion, The Political Dynamics of Corporate Legislation: Lessons from Israel, 11
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 185, 303 & n.642 (2006) (finding that “Israeli companies could
incorporate in a foreign country” and continuing that “[t]he Israeli corporate law, like its
American counterpart and as opposed to European corporate laws, applies the ‘state of
incorporation’ doctrine and not the ‘real seat’ doctrine to the corporation’s internal affairs”).
81. See Tomotaka Fujita, Regulation on Simplified and Foreign Companies in Japan, 33 ARIZ. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 93, 103 (2016) (“[T]he definition of ‘foreign company’ under Japanese law is
quite formal, and the law of the state of incorporation governs corporate internal affairs.”).
82. Dan Prentice, The Incorporation Theory—The United Kingdom, 14 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 631,
633–34 (2003) (“It is the law of the domicile of the corporation—that is, the place of
incorporation—that governs all aspects of the affairs of a company and this includes its creation,
continued existence, internal management, and the creation of its share capital.”).
83. ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 3, at 1–3.
84. See Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 8, at 1425.
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2000s.85 These firms are the talk of the town for any investment banker or
transactional lawyer specializing in initial public offerings (IPO) on Wall
Street these days. As reported in The New York Times, “Chinese firms accounted
for four of the 10 largest [IPO] offerings in 2018 ranked by amount raised on
American exchanges, the most of any country, including the United States.”86
Understanding Delaware’s weakness competing in the emerging
international market for corporate law is also critical to map out the future of
corporate law theory and policy. While the standard account has us believe
that Delaware is the unquestioned gold standard for corporate law, if a large
group of firms eligible to shop for corporate law do not choose Delaware law,
it might shed light on whether Delaware corporate law is indeed ideal to begin
with—or it might lend support to the idea that corporations might have
differentiated taste for corporate law and that there may not be an ideal set of
governance rules that work in all settings. It might also teach us lessons about
the desirability (or perils) of exporting Delaware corporate law to foreign
nations with vastly different market environments.
The next Section presents original data uncovering Delaware’s global
competitiveness, measured by the corporate law preferences of foreign
companies listed in American stock markets.
B. DELAWARE’S UNPOPULARITY
This Section presents evidence that Delaware’s dominance of the
corporate charter market may be a parochial, American phenomenon.
Foreign corporations raising capital in American stock markets—particularly
those headquartered in China—have largely abandoned Delaware in recent
years in favor of offshore jurisdictions including the Cayman Islands and the
British Virgin Islands. This phenomenon is particularly perplexing, since
existing theories would predict that these firms would prefer Delaware
corporate law to make their shares more appealing to American investors.87
This study surveyed all publicly traded foreign corporations listed in
American stock markets, principally made up of corporations listed in the

85. Jesse M. Fried & Matthew Schoenfeld, The Risky Business of Investing in Chinese Tech Firms,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 4, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/
02/04/the-risky-business-of-investing-in-chinese-tech-firms [https://perma.cc/3834-PDTU] (“China’s
tech darlings began tapping U.S. investors in the early 2000s, when mainland capital markets
were unsophisticated and the strict profitability requirements of PRC exchanges shut out most
fast-growing tech firms.”).
86. See Stephen Grocer, Chinese Companies Flocked to U.S. Markets in 2018. The Trade War May
Have Had a Role, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/02/business/
dealbook/trade-war-china-ipos.html [https://perma.cc/XQ57-74AH].
87. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1416, 1420 (1989) (“The managers who pick the state of incorporation that is most desirable
from the perspective of investors will attract the most money.”).
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New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ.88 Using Standard & Poor’s
Compustat database (a compilation of public financial data for publicly
traded corporations), I gathered 34 years of all publicly available data, from
1985–2018.89 Table 1 and Figure 1 present a crude metric, examining the
corporate law preferences of foreign firms listed in American stock markets
that opt out of their home countries’ corporate law—that is, the place of
incorporation for foreign firms that are actively shopping for corporate law.90
Table 1. Place of Incorporation for Foreign Companies Shopping
for Corporate Law

Figure 1. Place for Incorporation for Foreign Companies Shopping for
Corporate Law
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88. Data is on file with author. NASDAQ and the New York Stock Exchange are the two
biggest stock markets in the United States. Other stock markets included in the study are
companies listed in the American Stock Exchange, OTC Bulletin Board, Boston Stock Exchange,
Midwest Exchange, Pacific Exchange, and Philadelphia Exchange.
89. A few details on the methodology of data collection are worth mentioning. I aggregated
the data using Wharton Research Data Service’s Compustat. This aggregated dataset consisted a
large number of duplicate inputs. I filtered out the duplicates using the statistics software, SPSS.
Using SPSS, I also disaggregated the data by jurisdiction of incorporation. Using SPSS, I also
eliminated firms that incorporate in their home jurisdictions.
90. Cf. Barzuza, Nevada, supra note 32, at 948 n.33 (illustrating a similar table on Nevada’s
corporate law shopping aggregated with Compustat).

A2_MOON (DO NOT DELETE)

1702

5/23/2021 3:34 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 106:1683

While Delaware was by far the single most popular jurisdiction for foreign
firms listing in the United States decades ago (attracting close to double
the number of firms incorporating in foreign nations combined), it has
dramatically declined in capturing the market share of foreign firms that
actively shop for corporate law. In other words, a significant percentage of
corporations that shop for corporate law appear uninterested in Delaware
corporate law.
Several caveats warrant attention. First, the dataset excludes firms that
incorporate in the jurisdiction where they maintain their headquarters. This
is because a large number of foreign corporations raising capital in the United
States are prohibited from opting out of their home countries’ corporate law.
Thus, for instance, South Korean law requires all firms headquartered in
South Korea to be bound by South Korean corporate law, regardless of the
place of incorporation.91 Second, it is entirely plausible that Delaware’s overall
decline in attracting foreign firms might be largely due to the changing
demographics of firms listed in the United States, as opposed to shifting taste
among existing firms. More specifically, it might be driven in large parts by
the explosive growth in the number of Chinese firms listed in the United
States in the past two decades.
Indeed, the best evidence of Delaware’s unpopularity among foreign
firms comes from Chinese corporations that are listed in American stock
markets.92 For a variety of reasons, the vast majority of Chinese firms listed
in the United States—including Baidu, Nio, Lufax, and Alibaba—are
incorporated outside of China.93 These corporations, in other words, actively

91. Kyung-Hoon Chun, Kon-Sik Kim, Hyeok-Joon Rho & Ok-Rial Song, General Introduction,
in CORPORATIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS IN SOUTH KOREA § 6.1 (3d ed. 2019) (“[I]f corporations
incorporated in foreign countries have their principal business offices in Korea or transact their
principal business in Korea, then such corporations shall be governed by the law of Korea.”).
Firms like LG Display (listed in NASDAQ) and Woori Bank (listed in the New York Stock
Exchange) therefore cannot shop for corporate law. See id.; see also Rajeshni Naidu-Ghelani, South
Korea’s 10 Biggest Companies, CNBC (Sept. 13, 2013, 4:33 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2012/07/
23/South-Koreas-10-Biggest-Companies.html [https://perma.cc/3FFC-F4W9] (providing a list
of South Korean companies which cannot shop for U.S. corporate law). Interestingly, South
Korean e-commerce giant Coupang recently listed in the New York State Exchange as a Delaware
entity. Even so, Coupang's SEC filings make clear that the company is largely bound by South
Korean corporate law. See, e.g., Coupang, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 50 (Feb. 12,
2021) (“Under applicable Korean law, directors of a Korean company, such as Coupang Corp.,
owe a fiduciary duty to the company itself rather than to its stockholders. This fiduciary duty
obligates directors of a Korean company to perform their duties faithfully for the good of the
company as a whole.”).
92. While there are a few noteworthy exceptions, these corporations principally operate
exclusively in China and all of their directors and officers reside in China. See, e.g., ZST Digit.
Networks, Inc., Registration Statement (Amend. 1 on Form S-1/A) (Jan. 14, 2010).
93. One central reason is the regulatory burdens imposed by the Chinese government on
firms incorporated in China. Chinese corporations use legal loopholes and intermediate entities
formed in foreign nations to gain access to American capital markets. See Wayne Duggan, The
Chinese Corporate Structure That Terrifies American Investors, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 26, 2017,
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shop for corporate law.94 While some of these corporations choose to
incorporate in one of the constituent states of the United States, Chinese
corporations listed in American stock markets overwhelmingly choose to
incorporate offshore (in the Cayman Islands in particular).

10:13 AM), https://money.usnews.com/investing/articles/2017-01-26/the-chinese-corporatestructure-that-terrifies-american-investors [https://perma.cc/338A-TC8R]. More specifically,
Chinese companies listing in American stock markets typically employ a variable interest entity
(VIE) structure. VIE is a corporate architecture that “is usually composed of an intermediary
wholly foreign-owned entity (WFOE), which is a shell company registered in offshore
jurisdictions, and multiple operating entities registered in China.” Lianrui Jia, Going Public and
Going Global: Chinese Internet Companies and Global Finance Networks, 13 WESTMINSTER PAPERS
COMMC’N & CULTURE 17, 25 (2018). Through a series of contractual agreements detailing the
level of control and cash flow, the intermediary is linked to the operating entity in China. Id.
Foreign investors, under this structure, do not directly own shares in the operating entities in
China, but instead in the intermediary. See Jesse M. Fried & Ehud Kamar, Alibaba: A Case Study of
Synthetic Control 14 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., L. Working Paper No. 533/2020, 2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3644019 [https://perma.cc/NNQ6-2CVY].
The Chinese government thus enables firms based in China to shop for corporate law by
“tolerating” the widely used VIE structure.
94. Cf. Barzuza, Nevada, supra note 32, at 948 n.33 (describing firms that incorporate
outside of their home states as “firms that shop for law”). The fact that Chinese corporations are
opting out of Chinese corporate law—said to be restrictive and underdeveloped—is not
particularly surprising. This is especially true for the corporations that have chosen to list in
American stock markets, abandoning China’s relatively undeveloped capital markets. After all,
leading scholars have previously documented problems associated with China’s relatively new
corporate and securities laws. See generally Donald C. Clarke, The Independent Director in Chinese
Corporate Governance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 125 (2006) [hereinafter Clarke, Independent Director]
(assessing that proponents independent directors in China misconceive the nature of the
corporate governance problem in China); Donald C. Clarke, Corporate Governance in China: An
Overview, 14 CHINA ECON. REV. 494 (2003) [hereinafter Clarke, Corporate Governance in China]
(discussing how a primary problem of Chinese corporate governance law stems from the state
policy of maintaining a full or controlling ownership interest in enterprises in several sectors).
But the fact that the Chinese corporations are actively shopping for corporate law, yet rejecting
Delaware—and its purportedly value-enhancing law—demands further explanation.
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Table 2. Place of Incorporation for Chinese Corporations Listed in
American Stock Markets

Figure 2. Place of Incorporation for Chinese Corporations Listed in
American Stock Markets95
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Table 2 and Figure 2 show that this is a stark difference from decades
ago. In 1985, only ten Chinese corporations listed in American stock markets.
Nine out of the ten corporations incorporated in an American state, with four
out the nine choosing Delaware. Perhaps Chinese companies did not really
95. Figure 2 is constructed with data from Table 2. Note that the Marshall Islands, Antigua
and Barbuda, and Hong Kong are excluded in Figure 2 for optimal data visualization.
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shop for corporate law. “When in America, you go to Delaware,” they may
have been counseled. But times have changed. In the past two decades, there
has been a dramatic uptick in the number of Chinese corporations listing in
American stock markets, and they have attracted an army of American
investors looking to profit from China’s explosive growth. These firms have
collectively raised hundreds of billions of dollars from American investors
—largely without incorporating in Delaware.
While Delaware and Nevada continue to account for almost all Chinese
entities choosing to incorporate in the United States96 their collective market
shares have drastically declined with the growing popularity of offshore
jurisdictions. Similarly, while firms like PetroChina and China Eastern
Airlines are incorporated in China (thus governed by Chinese corporate
law),97 a solid majority of Chinese firms listed in the United States today are
incorporated in the Cayman Islands.
It is not for Delaware’s lack of trying. Foreign corporations incorporated
in Delaware can generate up to $200,000 per company annually for the state’s
government coffers.98 That is no small change for a state that has faced a
series of budget deficits in recent years.99 Indeed, official state government
publications are not shy about touting the advantages of Delaware corporate
law to foreign corporations.100 Dozens of incorporation service websites also
advertise Delaware corporate law targeting foreign clients.101 The Chinese,
however, apparently fail to appreciate these purported benefits.

96. This fact is important because it undermines the possibility that Chinese firms are
choosing the place of incorporation randomly. Nevada’s sustained popularity among Chinese
firms over the past several decades is not a coincidence. Similar to the Cayman Islands and the
British Virgin Islands, Nevada offers lax corporate governance rules favorable to corporate
managers. Professor Barzuza describes Nevada corporate law as a near “liability-free jurisdiction.”
Barzuza, Nevada, supra note 32, at 947.
97. See, e.g., PetroChina Co. Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F) 1 (Apr. 29, 2019).
98. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 503(c) (2021); see also Delaware Franchise Tax FAQ,
DELAWAREINC.COM, https://www.delawareinc.com/delaware-franchise-tax [https://perma.cc/
D9LT-GQ35] (explaining that the Delaware Franchise Tax could range from $175 to $200,000
calculated based on a company’s authorized shares).
99. See Matthew Albright, Delaware’s Budget Hole Deepens by $35.6 Million, DEL. ONLINE (Mar.
20, 2017, 5:51 PM), https://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/politics/2017/03/20/budgetgap-grows/99423566 [https://perma.cc/Z29L-H5W4].
100. See Beyond the Borders: Delaware’s Benefits for International Business, DELAWARE.GOV,
https://corplaw.delaware.gov/delawares-benefits-international-business [https://perma.cc/5E9UJXCN](“Delaware’s business statutes generally provide a number of advantages to international
businesses. Delaware law also permits and provides efficient procedures for business combinations
and other transactions, including mergers, transfers, and conversions.”).
101. One website, for instance, describes corporate attorneys across the United States being
“well-versed in Delaware law” and the Delaware Court of Chancery judges’ “extensive knowledge
of Delaware business laws” as some of the advantages of incorporating in Delaware. See e.g., Why
Incorporate in Delaware?, USA CORP. SERVS. INC., https://www.usa-corporate.com/new-businessresources/incorporate-in-delaware [https://perma.cc/4HCE-8GBT].

A2_MOON (DO NOT DELETE)

1706

5/23/2021 3:34 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 106:1683

Hundreds of foreign companies abandoning Delaware as their preferred
jurisdiction for incorporation could be bad news for those who celebrate the
merits of Delaware corporate law.102 It might be an indication that Delaware
corporate law was never ideal, and the lack of serious competition from other
states in the United States allowed Wilmington’s corporate law empire to
sustain itself. This account is supported by a number of leading scholars who
have called the inter-state charter competition metaphor a “myth”103 or at best
“a leisurely walk” based on the observation that no other state besides
Delaware appears to care about collecting corporate franchise taxes.104 As
observed by Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar, “[o]ther than Delaware, no
state is engaged in significant efforts to attract incorporations of public
companies.”105
Delaware also contends with several entrenched interest groups that
may make offshore jurisdictions seem more attractive.106 Existing literature
documents how these interest groups’ rent-seeking behavior may have
collectively eroded the state’s competitiveness. In addition to a cottage
industry of businesses that specialize in incorporation services,107 the state’s
local corporate lawyers benefit from the state’s notoriously vague corporate
code that generates a garden variety of corporate law disputes.108 It is for this

102. It could also support the hypothesis that the complex web of mandatory federal
securities laws that kick in when foreign firms list in American stock markets puts American states
at a competitive disadvantage in attracting foreign firms. See Simmons, Delaware’s Global Threat,
supra note 8, at 222. After all, a number of disclosures mandated by federal securities laws may
be avoided by foreign corporations simply by declining to incorporate in the United States,
thereby being classified as foreign private issuers. I explore this possibility further in Section III.B,
but remain skeptical that federal securities laws can fully account for the foreign aversion to
Delaware law.
103. Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 679, 684 (2002) [hereinafter Kahan & Kamar, Myth].
104. Bebchuk & Hamdani, Leisurely Walk, supra note 51, at 556.
105. Kahan & Kamar, Myth, supra note 103, at 684. This point is contested. For instance,
Roberta Romano maintains that “given Delaware’s dominance, most other states engage in
defensive competition, acting to retain domestic corporations, rather than seeking to lure
corporations away from Delaware and unseat it as the market leader.” Roberta Romano, Market
for Corporate Law Redux, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: VOLUME 2: PRIVATE
AND COMMERCIAL LAW 358, 363 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017) [hereinafter Romano, Corporate Law
Redux]. Others have argued that “[a]t least two states—Delaware and Nevada—are vigorously
attempting to attract out-of-state incorporations.” Barzuza, Nevada, supra note 32, at 994.
106. Popular offshore jurisdictions like the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands,
unlike most American states, are small enough to rely on corporate franchise taxes for
government revenue. See Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 8, at 1429. This reliance
enables them to credibly commit to maintaining corporate governance rules that more or less
reflect private sector preferences. Id. at 1436.
107. See, e.g., Delaware Mail Forwarding and Virtual Office Services, DELAWAREINC.COM,
https://www.delawareinc.com/ourservices/mail-forwarding [https://perma.cc/9WUC-QZMK].
108. Macey & Miller, supra note 55, at 486; Jonathan Macey, Delaware: Home of the World’s Most
Expensive Raincoat, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1131, 1132 (2005) (“The Delaware judiciary has created
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reason that Delaware lawyers are, on average, the highest paid lawyers in the
United States.109 The private sector’s firm grip over the corporate lawmaking
process in Delaware is hardly a secret.110 Delaware judges may also have a
role—with a prominent scholar recently assessing that Delaware judges
principally serve to maximize their reputation.111 Together, these interest
groups may have taken too big of a bite out of Delaware’s success, rendering
the regime unduly expensive for foreign clients.112
Delaware’s corporate law empire may be challenged if hundreds of
Chinese corporations help popular offshore jurisdictions like the Cayman
Islands build large bodies of case law and reputable dispute resolution
mechanisms.113 After all, a significant competitive advantage enjoyed by
Delaware is network externalities: the fact that a large number of companies
are already incorporated there, generating an impressive body of case law and
an unusually large number of lawyers familiar with Delaware corporate law.114

an environment in which lawsuits are plentiful, legal fees are high, and attorneys’ fees generously
awarded . . . .”).
109. Kahan & Kamar, Myth, supra note 103, at 695 (“[T]he average income of Delaware
lawyers is higher than that of lawyers in any other state, or even any city, in the country.”).
110. The Delaware legislature regularly “responds to the bar’s pulling the ‘fire alarm’ by
enacting the proposed initiatives.” Romano, Corporate Law Redux, supra note 105, at 364. Of
course, corporate law is hardly the only field subject to interest group pressures. See e.g., MAXWELL
L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW 358 (2009);
Michael Pappas & Victor B. Flatt, The Costs of Creating Environmental Markets: A Commodification
Primer, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 731, 739 (2019).
111. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interest Group Analysis of Delaware Law: The Corporate Opportunity
Doctrine as a Case Study, in CAN DELAWARE BE DETHRONED?: EVALUATING DELAWARE’S DOMINANCE
OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 57, at 120, 122 (“[T]he most plausible explanation for the
behavior of the Delaware courts in this context appears to be their interest in maximizing their
reputation.”). Law professors, including myself, should not be immune to an interest group
analysis. Legal academics with expertise on Delaware corporate law are often paid handsomely
for producing expert opinions used in high stakes litigation in the Delaware Court of Chancery.
112. It is also worth noting that Delaware, exploiting its market-dominant position, charges
higher fees than other states. As explained by Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar, “Delaware is the
only state that imposes substantial franchise taxes unrelated to the amount of business that firms
conduct in the state.” Kahan & Kamar, Price Discrimination, supra note 6, at 1218.
113. See Alyssa S. King, Global Civil Procedure, HARV. INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2021)
(manuscript at 29), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3652731 [https://
perma.cc/35FS-4SGM] (“For common law jurisdictions like Delaware or Bermuda, deciding
more cases also enriches local corporate law, so that competing for litigants can be part of a larger
strategy of competing for corporate [charter] registration.”). To a certain extent, prominent
offshore jurisdictions have already established sophisticated legal infrastructures necessary to
compete globally. See Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 8, at 1437–39. Professor Pam
Bookman describes these offshore business courts as “arbitral courts” that replicate features of
international commercial arbitration. See Pamela K. Bookman, Arbitral Courts, VA. J. INT’L L.
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 3), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=3691254 [https://perma.cc/SR2T-UMK4] [hereinafter Bookman, Arbitral Courts].
114. The concept of network externalities refers to the benefits of incorporating in a
jurisdiction where a large number of other firms have incorporated. See Klausner, supra note 51,
at 843–45. These benefits include: (1) a robust body of case law enhancing the predictability of
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Thus, offshore corporate law havens’ increasing network effects, jet-fueled by
the Chinese, may accelerate the pace of firms incorporating away from
Delaware.
We are already seeing signs of popular offshore jurisdictions becoming
important players in the emerging global market for corporate charters.
Dozens of publicly-traded corporations physically headquartered in the
United States—including Accenture Consulting, Helen of Troy, Hudson
Group, Vantage Drilling Company, Lazard, Herbalife, and Fruit of the
Loom—are already incorporated offshore, principally to the Cayman Islands,
Bermuda, and the British Virgin Islands.115 These three jurisdictions have also
launched specialized business courts in recent years, offering expert business
law jurists resolving complex corporate law disputes.116
It is thus urgently important to understand Delaware’s unpopularity
among foreign corporations and to properly diagnose it, because it could
point to larger defects in the content of Delaware corporate law. It could also
have important implications concerning the desirability of foreign nations
importing Delaware corporate law.
The next Part takes up this task, extrapolating causal variables that
account for Delaware’s surprising unpopularity in the emerging international
market for corporate law.
III. ACCOUNTING FOR DELAWARE’S WEAKNESS COMPETING IN THE
GLOBAL MARKET FOR CORPORATE LAW
This Part explains Delaware’s unpopularity among foreign corporations
raising capital in American stock markets. Section III.A examines whether tax
reduction strategies may account for why foreign corporations are averse to
Delaware law. Because tax and corporate law are bundled in the United

the law; and (2) a large group of lawyers who can efficiently provide legal services by the virtue
of their extensive practice experience in one jurisdiction. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, Leisurely Walk,
supra note 51, at 586–87. Network effects, of course, are not just limited to corporate law. For an
excellent recent work on the network effects of financial benchmarks, see Sue S. Guan, Benchmark
Competition, 80 MD. L. REV. 1, 25–27 (2020).
115. See Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 8, at 1406; Christopher M. Bruner,
Leveraging Corporate Law: A Broader Account of Delaware’s Competition, 80 MD. L. REV. 72, 78 (2020)
(discussing the significant role played by “British Overseas Territories” including “Bermuda, the
British Virgin Islands, and the Cayman Islands”); Darren Rosenblum, The Futility of Walls: How
Traveling Corporations Threaten State Sovereignty, 93 TUL. L. REV. 645, 661–62 (2019) (discussing
how Helen of Troy completed an “inversion transaction through which it became the subsidiary
of a Bermuda shell corporation”).
116. See Simmons, Delaware’s Global Threat, supra note 8, at 243 (“[F]oreign jurisdictions
desiring to attract foreign capital investment or prevent corporate migration may model or adopt
Delaware-style adjudicative features and legal precedents to both create value for business
litigants and enhance their reputations as business hubs.”); Moon, Delaware’s New Competition,
supra note 8, at 1423 (documenting the emergence of “specialized business courts in offshore
jurisdictions that supply the judicial infrastructure necessary to handle complex corporate law
disputes”); Bookman, Arbitral Courts, supra note 113, at 17.
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States,117 tax could in theory incentivize foreign corporations to incorporate
offshore, even if they may have preferred Delaware strictly from a corporate
law standpoint. After dismissing tax avoidance as the sole reason for
Delaware’s unpopularity, Section III.B weighs the possibility that federal
securities law may be undermining Delaware’s competitiveness. After all,
foreign firms incorporating in Delaware (as opposed to the Cayman Islands)
would lose their “foreign issuer” status under federal securities law, and
thereby subject themselves to heightened disclosure standards governing a
typical American corporation listed in the United States. Concluding that
neither tax nor federal securities law can offer a full descriptive account,
Section II.C provides a corporate law explanation for Delaware’s weakness
competing in the emerging international market for corporate law: Delaware
is losing to offshore foreign nations largely because of the content of its
corporate law.
A. ALL ABOUT TAX REDUCTION?
It is no secret that corporations from Apple to Uber use offshore “tax
havens” to evade or avoid domestic tax liability.118 Corporate tax reduction
strategies are, indeed, alive and well even after the recent federal tax
legislation enacted in 2017.119 Tax incentives are said to be responsible for
the wave of corporate inversions, where American companies incorporate in
offshore jurisdictions like Bermuda to reduce domestic tax liability.120
117. Kane & Rock, supra note 27, at 1230; Rosenblum, supra note 115, at 669.
118. See Moon, Tax Havens, supra note 66, at 1081–83. A rich body of tax law scholarship
explains how federal tax law is incentivizing American corporations to change their legal
residency into small offshore “tax havens” to reduce domestic tax liability. See, e.g., Andrew BlairStanek, Intellectual Property Law Solutions to Tax Avoidance, 62 UCLA L. REV. 2, 14 (2015); Daniel
Shaviro, The Rising Tax-Electivity of U.S. Corporate Residence, 64 TAX L. REV. 377, 378 (2011).
119. MATTHEW GARDNER, STEVE WAMHOFF, MARY MARTELLOTTA & LORENA ROQUE, INST. ON
TAX’N & ECON. POL’Y, CORPORATE TAX AVOIDANCE REMAINS RAMPANT UNDER NEW TAX LAW 1
(2019), https://itep.sfo2.digitaloceanspaces.com/04119-Corporate-Tax-Avoidance-RemainsRampant-Under-New-Tax-Law_ITEP.pdf [https://perma.cc/36MU-9KSY]; see also Lynnley Browning
& Eric Newcomer, Uber Created a $6.1 Billion Dutch Weapon to Avoid Paying Taxes, BLOOMBERG
(Aug. 8, 2019, 3:36 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-08/uber-created-a6-1-billion-dutch-weapon-to-avoid-paying-taxes [https://perma.cc/GG8C-VP9C] (“Uber’s moves
signal how the Republican tax law, which cut the corporate rate to 21% from 35%, failed to
encourage companies to bring IP and profits back to the US, because companies can still pay lower
taxes by keeping certain entities overseas.”).
120. The place of incorporation rule is responsible for enabling tax arbitrage opportunities.
This rule determines the corporation’s legal location based on the entity’s place of incorporation,
“permitting firms headquartered or managed in the United States to avoid U.S. taxpayer status
by reincorporating in foreign jurisdictions.” William J. Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, 72 VAND.
L. REV. 1, 11 (2019) [hereinafter Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance]. While the new federal tax
bill enacted in 2017 attempted to abandon important aspects of the incorporation rule, it is at
best a “hybrid” model that inevitably turns on the place of incorporation as a factor in assessing
corporate tax. Reuven Avi-Yonah, The Tax Act Actually Promotes Off-Shore Tax Tricks, AM.
PROSPECT (June 28, 2018), https://prospect.org/power/tax-act-actually-promotes-off-shore-taxtricks [https://perma.cc/GMY2-5E4W]. Legal scholars have only begun to assess the tax
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Legal scholars, accordingly, have diagnosed the American corporate
inversion movement as a byproduct of tax reduction strategies. Professors
Mitchell Kane and Ed Rock, for instance, describe U.S.-based corporate
inversions as “unabashedly all about tax reduction,”121 assessing that tax forces
American firms to incorporate in jurisdictions that supply suboptimal
corporate law.122
It may seem reasonable at first glance, thus, to attribute foreign
corporations’ abandonment of Delaware to tax incentives. Indeed, the
current Federal Tax Code subjects foreign companies merely incorporated in
the United States to federal tax, even if they operate entirely outside of the
United States.123 This includes potential U.S. corporate income tax as well
as “levies on rents, royalties, interest and gains from the disposal of
investments.”124 Perhaps the expected corporate tax reduction is so great that
foreign corporations are willing to opt into “suboptimal” Cayman law, even
though they would have preferred Delaware law.125 Just like American
corporations such as Helen of Troy and Fruit of the Loom that have gone
offshore, Chinese corporations like Baidu or Weibo presumably also want to
minimize global tax liability.126
Indeed, several executives of prominent Chinese corporations listed in
the United States have openly declared tax savings as the reason for leaving
Delaware. Consider the case of Sohu.com, a major on-line multiplayer gaming
implications of the new tax bill, with initial accounts assessing it as a modest improvement. See
David Kamin, David Gamage, Ari Glogower, Rebecca Kysar, Darien Shanske, Reuven Avi-Yonah,
Lily Batchelder, J. Clifton Fleming, Daniel Hemel, Mitchell Kane, David Miller, Daniel Shaviro &
Manoj Viswanathan, The Games They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches Under the 2017
Tax Legislation, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1439, 1488 (2019) (“[T]he old system of U.S. international
tax rules, prior to the new tax legislation, was also the subject of considerable tax gaming and
inefficiency. As measured against the baseline of old law, some of the new rules represent modest
improvements.”).
121. Kane & Rock, supra note 27, at 1230.
122. Id. at 1233 (“[T]ax-motivated corporate locational decisions can lead to an efficiency
cost to the extent that corporations are steered into suboptimal legal regimes from a corporate
law standpoint.”).
123. Under § 7874 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code of 1986, corporations with no
operations in the United States may be treated as a U.S. corporation for U.S. federal income tax
purposes by the virtue of incorporating in the United States. See 26 U.S.C. § 7874 (2018); see also
Susan C. Morse, Startup Ltd.: Tax Planning and Initial Incorporation Location, 14 FLA. TAX REV. 319,
322 (2013) (“A firm incorporated in Delaware that lacks any corporate functions in the United
States must still pay US corporate income tax.”).
124. Chen, supra note 74.
125. Kane & Rock, supra note 27, at 1231 (“[C]orporate tax consequences of migration can
make the cost of choosing the desired corporate law prohibitive. In this way, corporate tax can
trap firms in a suboptimal jurisdiction from the standpoint of corporate law.”).
126. Indeed, the Chinese are no newcomers to the offshore world. “Round tripping” is a
technique widely used by the Chinese in forming closely-held business entities, accounting for
why the British Virgin Islands is the second largest foreign direct investor into mainland China.
See Ken Davies, While Global FDI Falls, China’s Outward FDI Doubles, 1 TRANSNAT’L CORPS. REV. 20,
21 (2009).
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company based in Beijing. In attempting to garner support from shareholders
to re-domicile the company from Delaware to the Cayman Islands in 2018,
MIT-educated scientist and founder Charles Zhang offered the following
explanation: “We have zero operations in the U.S. . . . . For U.S. taxes, by redomiciling we can avoid taxes that we shouldn’t pay.”127
But tax is, at best, only a partial explanation. For one, at least some of the
foreign companies that re-domicile out of Delaware may still be subject
to federal income tax. For instance, China Biologic Products, which left
Delaware for the Cayman Islands in 2017, reports in its SEC disclosures that
the firm “will continue to be treated as a U.S. corporation for U.S. federal
income tax purposes.”128
Perhaps more importantly, if tax were the main reason, one would
predict that foreign firms would contractually specify Delaware-type corporate
rules in their corporate bylaws or corporate charters.129 After all, popular
“offshore corporate law havens” like the Cayman Islands impose fewer
mandatory rules than Delaware,130 meaning that corporations can choose to
contractually provide higher (Delaware-level) protection for shareholders. It
also bears noting that institutional investors are substantial shareholders of
foreign firms listed in American stock markets,131 who would have presumably
demanded Delaware (or at least Delaware-like) corporate governance rules,
should they feel that it is necessary.132 Foreign firms understand that they
127. Chen, supra note 74 (quoting Charles Zhang).
128. China Biologic Prods., Inc., Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 9 (May 19, 2017). It is also
worth noting that Chinese corporations that have gone offshore are not choosing jurisdictions
randomly. For instance, while American corporations incorporating in foreign nations have
frequently chosen Bermuda as their place of incorporation (a jurisdiction that offers virtually
equivalent corporate and capital gains tax as the Cayman Islands or the British Virgin Islands),
no Chinese company listed in the United States has chosen to incorporate in Bermuda. See Moon,
Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 8, at 1426 n.106. This data gives further support to the idea
that there is more than tax at play.
129. Corporate laws of prominent offshore jurisdictions like the Cayman Islands and the
British Virgin Islands are predominantly made up of default rules, meaning that corporations
can choose to deviate from them by contractual specifications. See Moon, Delaware’s New
Competition, supra note 8, at 1148–49. Different jurisdictions maintain different formal mechanisms
to contractually customize corporate governance rules that deviate from the default rules.
130. Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 8, at 1142.
131. See Zhang Shidong, US Investors Holding US$1 Trillion of Chinese Stocks in a Spot of Bother
as Trump’s Investment Ban Nears, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 7, 2021, 9:00 PM), https://
www.scmp.com/business/markets/article/3116795/us-investors-holding-us1-trillion-chinesestocks-spot-bother [https://perma.cc/D9DM-DBMM] (“[I]nstitutional investors account
for 86 per cent of the exposure to Chinese equities, according to Goldman Sachs.”).
132. One might make the case that Delaware corporate law may not be as effective absent
Delaware’s legal infrastructure—namely, access to Delaware courts. See Érica Gorga & Michael
Halberstam, Litigation Discovery and Corporate Governance: The Missing Story About the “Genius of
American Corporate Law,” 63 EMORY L.J. 1383, 1418–1419 (2014). However, the Cayman Islands
and the British Virgin Islands have relatively-effective business courts that can adjudicate complex
corporate law disputes, and there appears little reason why firms would not include Delaware-like
rules if they want to appease American investors.
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could easily impose stricter, Delaware-style governance rules, but affirmatively
decide against it.
In order to test this hypothesis, I hand-collected and analyzed SEC
disclosures of all Chinese corporations listed in the New York Stock Exchange
and NASDAQ that are incorporated in the Cayman Islands.133 As shown in
Table 3, Chinese corporations that have gone to the Cayman Islands have
largely opted out of governance rules that are mandatory in Delaware,
choosing instead to adopt default rules offered by the Cayman Islands (or
“middle ground” rules forbidden under Delaware law).134 The fact that firms
are intentionally opting out of Delaware law suggests that corporate law is the
main driver of foreign firms going offshore.

133. I rely on the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission’s tracking of
Chinese companies listed in American stock markets. “As of October 2, 2020, there were 217
Chinese firms listed [in an American exchange].” Chinese Companies Listed on Major U.S.
Stock Exchanges, U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REV. COMM’N (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.uscc.gov/
chinese-companies-listed-major-us-stock-exchanges [https://perma.cc/WDR3-GXDR].
134. By “middle ground” rules, I mean rules that provide higher levels of protection for
shareholders than the default Cayman law, but nevertheless do not reach the protection
mandated under Delaware law. In many cases, Chinese firms incorporated in the Cayman
Islands do provide higher levels of protection than what is required under Cayman law.
Consider Sohu.com—the company’s prospectus states: “Sohu’s commitment to good corporate
governance has not changed and will not change after we are domiciled in the Cayman Islands.”
Sohu.com Inc. Chairman and CEO Issues Letter to Stockholders Regarding Special Meeting, CISION (May
16, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/sohucom-inc-chairman-andceo-issues-letter-to-stockholders-regarding-special-meeting-300649989.html [https://perma.cc/
VJL6-UULW]. Yet, a detailed review of Sohu’s SEC filings reveals that the company still elected to
opt out of a number of rules mandated under Delaware law, including minority shareholder
appraisal rights. See Sohu.com Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F) 153 (Mar. 28, 2019).
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Table 3. Transnational Contractual Corporate Governance

Corporate Governance
Rule Mandated by
Delaware but not by
Cayman Islands

Percentage of Chinese
Corporations Listed in
the United States that
Contractually Adopt
Delaware-Type Rules

Percentage of Chinese
Corporations Listed in
the United States that
Contractually Adopt
Cayman Islands Default
or “Middle Ground”
Rules

Annual Meeting135

16.3%

83.7%

Books and Records136

0%

100%

Appraisal Rights137

0%

100%

Consider, for instance, shareholder appraisal rights—an axiomatic
feature of Delaware corporate law. Whenever a company is a target of
takeover or merger, Delaware law gives shareholders “a statutory right to
reject the terms of an approved sale in favor of a judicial determination of
‘fair value’ for their shares.”138 SEC disclosures reveal that Chinese

135. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(c) (2020) (“If there be a failure to hold the annual meeting
or to take action by written consent to elect directors in lieu of an annual meeting for a period
of 30 days after the date designated for the annual meeting, or if no date has been designated,
for a period of 13 months after the latest to occur of the organization of the corporation, its last
annual meeting or the last action by written consent to elect directors in lieu of an annual
meeting, the Court of Chancery may summarily order a meeting to be held upon the application
of any stockholder or director.”).
136. Id. § 220(b) (“Any stockholder, in person or by attorney or other agent, shall, upon
written demand under oath stating the purpose thereof, have the right . . . to inspect for any
proper purpose, and to make copies and extracts from . . . [t]he corporation’s stock ledger, a list
of its stockholders, and its other books and records . . . .”).
137. Id. § 262(b) (“Appraisal rights shall be available for the shares of any class or series of
stock of a constituent corporation in a merger or consolidation to be effected.”).
138. Albert H. Choi & Eric Talley, Appraising the “Merger Price” Appraisal Rule, 34 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 543, 543 (2018). Shareholders of a Cayman Islands company do not have access to
Delaware’s appraisal rights regime, reportedly making it easier to “squeeze out” minority
shareholders. See Gary Smith & Ramona Tudorancea, Cayman Merger Take-Privates from NYSE and
NASDAQ—2016 Year in Review, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 9, 2017), https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/04/09/cayman-merger-take-privates-from-nyse-and-nasdaq2016-year-in-review [https://perma.cc/P8CP-F4CU]. Under Section 238 of Cayman Companies
Law, dissenting shareholders of a Cayman Islands incorporated company can apply to have the
fair value of their shares determined by the Grand Court. While Section 238 was modeled in
part by Section 262 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, there are major points of
differentiation. For instance, while Delaware entitles dissenters to their proportionate share of
the firm’s value, Cayman law permits minority discount. See Saniya Rao, Amid Chinese ADR
Delistings, the Role of Cayman’s Valuation Process Examined, CTFN (July 27, 2020), https://
ctfn.news/news/jul-27-2020-bita-sina-sogo-wuba-276975 [https://perma.cc/3QEQ-7SL4]. Moreover,
while the Cayman Islands Grand Court pays close attention to Delaware cases, it has made clear
that it is not bound to follow Delaware’s approach. Id. Given that the Cayman Islands case law is
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corporations largely opt out of shareholder appraisal rights by opting into
the default rules that operate in the Cayman Islands. YY Inc., China’s largest
video-based social network company, explains:
Unlike many jurisdictions in the United States, Cayman Islands law
does not generally provide for shareholder appraisal rights on an
approved arrangement and reconstruction of a company. This may
make it more difficult for you to assess the value of any consideration
you may receive in a merger or consolidation.139
Relatedly, Table 3 also helps us understand that Chinese firms know how
to contractually customize corporate governance rules,140 undermining the
possibility that they might have “accidentally” selected lax corporate
governance rules. These firms appear to have acute preferences to avoid
governance rules that are mandatory in Delaware.
At the very least, the assertion that federal tax law is to blame for
Delaware’s unpopularity needs to be tempered. This is particularly true given
that Nevada has carved out a sizable niche market attracting Chinese firms.
Since federal or state tax liability is not impacted whether a foreign
corporation is incorporated in Nevada or Delaware,141 it is unlikely that tax
can fully account for their preferences.
B. IS FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW UNDERMINING DELAWARE’S COMPETITIVENESS?
Even setting tax aside, Delaware may not be entirely to blame for its
global unpopularity. It may be because of the schizophrenic ways federal
securities law applies to foreign companies listed in the United States.142
Under current federal securities law, foreign firms trading in American stock
markets are referred to as “foreign issuers,” subject to less stringent disclosure
and reporting requirements than their American counterparts.143 But foreign

in its nascent stages (at least relative to Delaware), it remains to be seen to whether and to what
extent Cayman law will be hostile to minority shareholder rights.
139. YY Inc., Annual Report (Form 20-F) 49 (Apr. 26, 2019).
140. Cf. Fisch, Corporate Bylaws, supra note 30, at 373 (assessing that boards and shareholders
are “are increasingly using charter and bylaw provisions to customize their corporate
governance”).
141. Moon, Tax Havens, supra note 66, at 1093 (“[I]ncorporation decisions in the domestic
interstate context do not generally implicate a dramatic altering of the effective federal or state
tax rate, notwithstanding the differences in state franchise tax fees. Federal income tax is
unaffected because firms operating within the United States must pay federal taxes. State income
tax is unaffected because corporations must establish physical presence within a state to be subject
to that state’s tax.”).
142. See Steven M. Davidoff, Paradigm Shift: Federal Securities Regulation in the New Millennium,
2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 339, 359 (2008).
143. Talley, Inversions, supra note 68, at 1653 n.8; see also Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate
Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 329, 349 (2001) (“[B]y listing on
a U.S. stock exchange, the foreign company is obligated to register under Section 12(b) of the
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firms will lose their foreign issuer status if they choose to incorporate in an
American state. The heightened requirements include, for example, the
obligation to disclose holders of more than five percent of its outstanding
stock under Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.144 Thus,
by incorporating outside of the United States, Chinese companies can retain
their “foreign issuer” status, thereby bypassing some of the rules otherwise
imposed by federal securities law.145
It is already very common for foreign firms raising capital in American
stock markets to claim waivers using their foreign issuer status, and these
waivers are routinely granted.146 As Roberta Karmel explains, “[b]ecause the
reporting and disclosure requirements for listed companies are much more
onerous than those required by a foreign issuer’s home country, it is very
common for foreign issuers to seek waivers.”147 Thus, Chinese firms fearing
loss of their foreign issuer status may be avoiding Delaware to opt out of
at least some of the burdensome and costly requirements associated with
exchange rules and federal securities law. Indeed, Chinese companies
routinely claim foreign issuer exemptions, often claiming that their “home”
country is the Cayman Islands or the British Virgin Islands. For instance,
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, thereby voluntarily subjecting itself to a host of U.S. securities
regulations that have corporate governance implications.”).
144. See Gilson, supra note 143, at 350.
145. Id. (“[T]he SEC has allowed some exemptive relief for foreign issuers when the detail
of a particular requirement is inconsistent with the law of a foreign company’s home
jurisdiction.”). Closely related to the rules directly imposed by federal securities law are listing
rules imposed by stock exchanges like the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ. When foreign
firms list in a U.S.-based stock exchange, they must enter into a listing agreement with the New
York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ in order to have their securities traded on such market, which
all contain corporate governance provisions. See Coffee, Future as History, supra note 13, at 687.
As explained by Professor Coffee, “the standard NYSE requirements specify that a listed company
must (a) have at least two outside directors on its board, (b) establish and maintain an audit
committee composed of independent directors, and (c) set an appropriate quorum requirement
for shareholder meetings.” Id. While technically not part of federal securities law, these listing
rules are heavily driven by and sanctioned by the SEC. As Professor Robert Thompson explains,
“the SEC has had an important role in each change in the listing standards as an initiator and as
a driving force as to their substance, such that in some respects the listing standards appear a
thinly veiled substitute for federal government regulation rather than an alternative to it.” Robert
B. Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, State Law, and Federal Regulation,
38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 961, 977 (2003). Under an order approved by the SEC in 1987,
exchanges may “waive or modify certain enumerated listing standards for foreign issuers on a
case-by-case basis.” Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance Listing Requirements, 54
SMU L. REV. 325, 333 (2001). Thus, foreign firms listed in the United States may claim exception
from a wide-range of rules that are mandatory for American firms, including: “(1) [q]uarterly
reporting of interim earnings; (2) composition and election of the Board of Directors; (3)
shareholder approval requirements and voting rights; and (4) quorum requirements for
shareholder meetings.” Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by American Stock Exchange
and NYSE Relating to the Exchanges’ Listing Standards, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,230, 24,231 (June 29,
1987) (footnote omitted).
146. Karmel, supra note 145, at 334.
147. Id.
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21Vianet Group, Inc., a leading data service provider based in Beijing,
discloses in its annual report to the SEC: “Certain corporate governance
practices in the Cayman Islands, which is our home country, are considerably
different than the standards applied to U.S. domestic issuers. . . . We currently
follow our home country practice . . . .”148
While accurately capturing a morsel of descriptive reality, federal
securities law cannot fully account for the Chinese aversion to Delaware.
Perhaps most significantly, it cannot account for why Nevada—famous for its
lax rules for corporate managers149—has vastly outperformed Delaware in
attracting Chinese corporations. As shown in Table 2, Nevada has attracted
more than double the number of Chinese firms listed in American stock
markets as Delaware. Because Chinese firms incorporated in Nevada would
also be stripped of their foreign issuer status, it appears that there is more
than federal securities law at play.
The next Section takes a deep dive into the corporate governance
reasons that account for Delaware’s unpopularity among these foreign
companies.
C. THE ENDURING IMPORTANCE OF CORPORATE LAW
The foregoing analysis suggests that foreign corporations (and their
shareholders, to a certain extent) actually prefer the laws of the Cayman
Islands and the British Virgin Islands over Delaware law, even without tax or
federal securities law in the equation.
Of course, foreign corporations raising capital in American stock markets
are not monolithic entities. And we must carefully evaluate the corporate law
preferences of firms based on a host of factors, including the geographic
location of operations, type of industry, shareholder composition, and the
culture of corporate management. But because of their importance to the
general trend, this Section focuses on Chinese corporations raising capital in
American stock markets that appear to be actively shopping for corporate law.
While these firms would by no means constitute a representative survey of all
foreign firms listed in the United States, I focus on Chinese companies for
several reasons. First, they make up a crucially important segment of firms
listed in American stock markets that has thus far escaped the scholarly
scrutiny they deserve.150 The number of (and the market capitalization of)
Chinese companies listed in NASDAQ and the New York Stock Exchange has
grown by leaps and bounds in recent decades,151 and Chinese firms in recent
148. 21Vianet Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 20-F) 41 (Mar. 27, 2019).
149. Barzuza, Nevada, supra note 32, at 994.
150. Collectively, the behavior of these corporations constitutes a natural social science
experiment that can be exploited to better understand firm choice of corporate law.
151. As noted by Tamar Groswald Ozery, Chinese companies currently traded on the U.S.
stock markets represent a “total market capitalization of $2.2 trillion.” Tamar Groswald Ozery,
Illiberal Governance and the Rise of China’s Public Firms: An Oxymoron or China’s Greatest Triumph?, 42
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years have dominated the American market for initial public offerings.152
Second, firms that operate outside of the United States (particularly those
that principally operate in East Asia, continental Europe, and Latin America)
face certain aspects of market environments that are closer to China than the
United States,153 thus providing a glimpse of insight into what may be driving
the overall foreign aversion to Delaware.
In doing so, this Section shows that corporate law matters a great deal,154
and identifies the principle reasons that may account for Delaware’s
unpopularity among Chinese firms. Importantly, Delaware’s elaborate legal
regime policing “self-dealing” transactions clashes with China’s contemporary
market dynamics, where firms operating as corporate groups routinely engage
in “self-dealing” transactions as part of normal business.155
1. Delaware’s Elaborate Legal Regime Policing
Self-Dealing Transactions
One of the central goals of corporate law is to remedy the agency
problem endemic in modern corporations. The agency problem derives from
U. PA. J. I NT’ L L. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 9), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3616513 [https://perma.cc/39PA-UN9J].
152. See Grocer, supra note 86 (“Last year . . . offerings from Chinese firms dominated the
United States market for initial public offerings. The three largest I.P.O.s by market value were
Chinese companies. And Chinese firms accounted for four of the 10 largest such offerings in
2018 ranked by amount raised on American exchanges, the most of any country, including the
United States, according to Dealogic.”).
153. See OECD, RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS AND MINORITY SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS 9 (2012),
https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/50089215.pdf [https://perma.cc/JZ5Z-ARR9] (“Around the
world, company groups and concentrated ownership are normal, the exceptions being in the
United Kingdom, the United States and Australia. Under such conditions, RPTs are mainly with the
controlling shareholders and/or with members of a company group.”).
154. In doing so, it complicates the widely presupposed assessment that corporate law
matters little when foreign firms raise capital in American stock markets because federal securities
law sufficiently displaces foreign corporate law when foreign corporations list in American stock
markets. See Coffee, Future as History, supra note 13, at 699 (“Even if some foreign jurisdictions
do grant controlling shareholders the discretionary power to take self-interested actions, this
discretion may be significantly constrained by federal securities regulation.”). While federal
securities law indeed matters a great deal for foreign firms listing in the United States, corporate
law is of central importance to any foreign firm deciding to list in the United States because they
must consider the risks (and costs) of potential shareholder lawsuits that can be brought in the
United States.
155. While there are competing ways to define a corporate group, “[t]he key defining
characteristic of a corporate group is typically common ownership.” Virginia Harper Ho, Theories
of Corporate Groups: Corporate Identity Reconceived, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 879, 886 (2012). The
importance of corporate groups in China has been well-documented. See, e.g., Li-Wen Lin &
Curtis J. Milhaupt, We Are the (National) Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism
in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697, 706 (2013) (“[B]usiness groups fostered by the political regime
and deeply entwined with Chinese Communist Party leadership may be central to the
developmental success of the regime.”). See also generally Lisa A. Keister, Interfirm Relations in China:
Group Structure and Firm Performance in Business Groups, 52 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1709 (2009)
(examining emergence of “interfirm lending and trade ties” in business groups within China).
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the separation of ownership and control that famously define modern
corporations: although shareholders technically “‘own’ the corporation, they
have virtually no decisionmaking powers.”156 Instead, the power to control the
firm is vested in the hands of the board of directors, who appoint officers
responsible for day-to-day operations of the firm.157
In the United States, shareholder litigation is one of the principal
ways for shareholders to hold both officers and directors accountable for
managerial misconduct, thereby ameliorating the agency problem.158 But
the system comes at a hefty cost. While Delaware’s judicial system has been
celebrated as the crown jewel of Delaware corporate law,159 it is by no means
a flawless system. Frivolous suits abound, with some legal scholars assessing
that the real winners of these suits are corporate lawyers in Delaware who
benefit from generating a stable stream of shareholder suits.160 Litigation risk
is immense for any large firm incorporated in Delaware. But these risks can
be especially endemic and prohibitively costly for firms that operate in certain
foreign nations.
One such risk is shareholder suits over self-dealing transactions.161
Teachers of American corporate law are intimately familiar with the concept

156. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 3 (3d ed. 2015); see also Paul H. Edelman,
Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism,
87 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1359, 1365 (2014) (“The common core of American corporation statutes is
a clear statement that all corporate power is placed in, or under the authority of, the board of
directors.”).
157. Edelman et al., supra note 156, at 1365.
158. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative
Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1749 (2004) (“[W]e believe derivative suits continue to play an
important role. . . . Public company suits continue to be filed and to make new law. . . . Moreover,
derivative suits against private companies perform an important, if less heralded, role in policing
conflict of interest transactions and duty of care violations.”); Reinier Kraakman, Hyun Park &
Steven Shavell, When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 GEO. L.J. 1733, 1733 (1994)
(“Shareholder suits are the primary mechanism for enforcing the fiduciary duties of corporate
managers.”). Foreign firms incorporating in Delaware necessarily opt into Delaware’s legal
regime by availing themselves to shareholder suits in Delaware. See Papendick v. Bosch, 410 A.2d
148, 152 (Del. 1979) (“[Bosch] purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of the
laws of the State of Delaware for financial gain in activities related to the cause of action. Therein
lies the ‘minimum contact’ sufficient to sustain the jurisdiction of Delaware’s courts over
[Bosch].”).
159. See Black, supra note 50, at 590; Fisch, Peculiar Role, supra note 73, at 1064 (attributing
Delaware’s success in attracting corporate charters to “the unique lawmaking function of the
Delaware courts”).
160. See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 55, 55–56 (1991) (“Critics of the shareholder suit assert that most of the suits are frivolous
and that the plaintiff’s bar is the true beneficiary of the litigation . . . .”).
161. Self-dealing transactions, also known as related-party transactions, are not easily
definable. As Geeyoung Min assesses, there is no universal definition of related parties
transactions. Geeyoung Min, The SEC and the Courts’ Cooperative Policing of Related Party Transactions,
2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 663, 674 (“The terms ‘related party’ and ‘transaction’ carry different
meanings depending on the regulation. . . . SEC Regulation S-K and the common law of duty of
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of self-dealing. Because directors and officers of corporations have superior
information over shareholders, they can exploit their positions to extract
wealth from the firm for private gain.162 In addition to outright looting, selfdealing transactions can manifest in various forms, including “compensation
agreements for directors, corporate opportunity cases and trading of
company shares by directors using price-sensitive information.”163 The law
governing self-dealing therefore attempts to put in place mechanisms to
police this well-known ailment in corporate law.
Under Delaware law, self-dealing is not strictly prohibited,164 but
either must be: (1) disclosed and approved by disinterested directors,165
(2) disclosed and approved in good faith by vote of the shareholders,166 or
(3) demonstrated to be “fair” to the corporation.167 A challenged transaction
approved by independent directors is subject to the business judgement rule
under Delaware law, almost guaranteeing dismissal of claims.168 However, a
challenged transaction is subject to the “fairness” standard of review if a
majority of the directors approving the challenged transaction were either
interested in the transaction or not independent of a person with an interest
in the transaction.169 Under the “fairness” standard of review, self-dealing
transactions must be demonstrated to be objectively fair to the corporation
and the minority shareholders.170 This will make it almost impossible to

loyalty cover much broader definitions of ‘related party transaction’ than Delaware General
Corporate Law Section 144 does.”).
162. It is for this reason that self-dealing shows up in some of the canonical early works on
American corporate law. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 230–32 (1932).
163. John H. Farrar & Susan Watson, Self Dealing, Fair Dealing and Related Party
Transactions—History, Policy and Reform, 11 J. CORP. L. STUD. 495, 496 (2011).
164. See Clarke, Independent Director, supra note 94, at 165–66; Andrew F. Tuch, Reassessing
Self-Dealing: Between No Conflict and Fairness, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 939, 952–55 (2019) [hereinafter
Tuch, Reassessing Self-Dealing].
165. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) (2020).
166. See id. § 144(a)(2). As noted by Professor Tuch, courts have “understood section
144(a)(2) to require approval by disinterested shareholders.” Tuch, Reassessing Self-Dealing, supra
note 164, at 956 n.117 (citing Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221–22 (Del. 1976)).
167. See tit. 8, § 144(a)(3); Tuch, Reassessing Self-Dealing, supra note 164, at 955.
168. This is because under the business judgement rule, the court must presume that
“directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that
the action taken was in the best interests of the company.” Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812
(Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
169. Tuch, Reassessing Self-Dealing, supra note 164, at 955. In the influential case of Sinclair Oil Corp.
v. Levien, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the intrinsic fairness standard applies to parentsubsidiary dealings where “the parent . . . causes the subsidiary to act in such a way that the parent
receives something from the subsidiary to the exclusion of, and detriment to, the minority
stockholders.” Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
170. Id.
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dismiss the lawsuit at the pleading stage, leading to costly litigation
concerning whether the transaction was “fair.”171
Notwithstanding the various critiques over this complex regime, this
system yields reasonable results for American corporations,172 where selfdealing transactions are relatively rare. To the extent that self-dealing
transactions do take place, independent directors can help “cleanse” those
transactions. Today, the vast majority of directors serving on the boards of
publicly traded American corporations are independent from management,
thus constituting a staple feature of the modern American corporate
governance paradigm.173
2. Why Delaware’s Legal Regime is a Misfit for Chinese Firms
Chinese firms avoid Delaware’s elaborate system of policing self-dealing
transactions for two distinct (but related) reasons: the volume of self-dealing
transactions and the lack of independent directors that can police these
transactions. More specifically, Chinese firms listed in the United States
typically operate as part of corporate groups, and self-dealing transactions that
occur routinely within corporate groups (referred to as “intra group
transactions” or “related party transactions”) would be subject to a floodgate
of litigation if these firms were incorporated in Delaware. Delaware’s
corporate law paradigm, thus, is operationally incompatible for Chinese firms
that principally operate outside of the United States.174
171. See Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 20 n.36 (Del. Ch. 2002) (noting that a
determination of fairness “normally will preclude dismissal of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss”); Kahn v. Household Acquisition Corp., 591 A.2d 166, 175 (Del. 1991)
(recognizing that a dispute over value is “a battle of experts”); see also Goshen, supra note 22, at
419 (“Determining the objective value of a transaction is a complicated process that requires a high
degree of competence from the courts since such valuations involve future projections of different
variables, all of which can affect the actual price, and the use of complex financial models.”).
172. Delaware’s jurisprudence on self-dealing is complex and fact-specific, leading to
reasonable guidelines policing of related party transactions. See Tuch, Reassessing Self-Dealing,
supra note 164, at 950–54. This jurisprudence comports with the general spirit of Delaware
corporate law, which is predominantly composed of standards rather than rules, leading to
reasonably determinant guidelines. According to Ed Rock, “Delaware courts provide a
supplemental source of gossip, criticism, and sanction for this set of actors who are beyond the
reach of the firm’s normal systems of social control.” Rock, supra note 73, at 1013.
173. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1465 (2007) (“Between 1950 and
2005, the composition of large public company boards dramatically shifted towards independent
directors, from approximately 20% independents to 75% independents.”); Yaron Nili, The Fallacy
of Director Independence, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 491, 493 (“[T]he composition of United States public
firms’ boards of directors has seen a dramatic shift. Boardrooms once controlled by company
executives have been almost entirely replaced by independent directors, often leaving the CEO
as the lone executive in the room.” (footnote omitted)).
174. Of course, the desirability of corporate groups and self-dealing transactions from a
societal standpoint is a separate question. After all, intra-group transactions can undermine
competition and, therefore, be toxic to consumer welfare. Antitrust policies, thus, have immense
consequences for firm behavior, including their preferred corporate governance structure. See
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Ubiquity of Corporate Groups

Iconic global conglomerates including Samsung (South Korean),
Daimler (German), and Mitsubishi (Japanese) operate not as standalone
companies but as part of corporate groups: a group of legally independent
firms under common ownership.175 For instance, Samsung currently consists
of 74 affiliated companies that collectively offer products and services ranging
from Samsung Galaxy phones to Samsung hospital and Samsung food
services.176 Daimler not only consists of companies including Mercedes-Benz,
Detroit Diesel, and Western Star, but also includes Mercedes-Benz Financial
Services and Mercedes-Benz Bank.177 While a relative rarity in the United
States, corporate groups are ubiquitous around the world, particularly in East
Asia, Latin America, and continental Europe.178
China is no exception, although Chinese corporate groups (unlike their
counterparts in South Korea and Japan) tend to be “vertically integrated firms
focused on a particular industry or sector, not diversified groups involved in
a wide range of industries.”179 Indeed, recent headline-grabbing Chinese
firms including Tencent, JD.com, Nio, and Baidu all operate as part of
corporate groups.180 This organizational structure accounts for why selfdealing transactions are pervasive in China. Because Chinese firms generally
operate in group structures, related corporations engage in intra-group
transactions as a natural result of “operating as one enterprise in the form of
a corporate group.”181 In my hand-collected survey of SEC filings, over 95

Yong Lim & Geeyoung Min, Competition and Corporate Governance: Teaming Up to Police Tunneling,
36 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 267, 270 (2016).
175. Heitor Almeida, Chang-Soo Kim & Hwanki Brian Kim, Internal Capital Markets in Business
Groups: Evidence from the Asian Financial Crisis, 70 J. FIN. 2539, 2539 (2015). A corporate group,
in its simplest form, involves two separate legal entities “placed under unified management.” See
Jens Dammann, Related Party Transactions and Intragroup Transactions, in THE LAW AND FINANCE OF
RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS 218, 218 (Luca Enriques & Tobias H. Tröger eds., 2019) [hereinafter
Dammann, Related].
176. Services and Others, SAMSUNG, https://www.samsung.com/levant/aboutsamsung1/samsung/
affiliatedcompanies_05 [https://perma.cc/VYY4-7KFL].
177. Daimler at a Glance, DAIMLER, https://www.daimler.com/company/at-a-glance.html
[https://perma.cc/7H6K-F53U] (selecting “Brands”).
178. See OECD, supra note 153, at 9. According to the OECD, transactions with directors
representing both sides of the transactions are fairly common, particularly in countries where
corporate groups are ubiquitous. Id.
179. Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 155, at 711.
180. According to Raymond Fisman and Yongxiang Wang, “[m]ost large Chinese firms belong[]
to a business group prior to listing [in an exchange].” Fisman & Wang, supra note 33, at 430.
181. Kim, Related, supra note 33, at 304; see also Yenpao Chen, Chien-Hsun Chen & Weiju
Chen, The Impact of Related Party Transactions on the Operational Performance of Listed Companies in
China, 12 J. ECON. POL’Y REFORM 285, 287 (2009) (“China’s enterprise groups in particular tend
to make extensive use of related party transactions for earnings management . . . .”).
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percent of Chinese firms listed in the United States but incorporated in the
Cayman Islands engage in related-party transactions.182
Chinese firms have reasons to operate as part of corporate groups, as
opposed to operating as standalone entities. This is because transactions
between affiliated companies within corporate groups can be economically
advantageous in nations with weak legal systems and less-developed capital
markets.183
Corporate groups, for one, “can help overcome or attenuate various types
of market failure[s]” that can naturally arise in the contractual relationships
between firms.184 As explained by Jens Dammann, “[i]f supplier and buyer are
both legally and economically independent, the supplier may fear that once
he has incurred substantial sunk costs, the buyer may use some pretext to
lower the price or otherwise ‘squeeze’ the buyer.”185
This opportunism, of course, can be curbed without necessarily setting
up complicated corporate group structures. In the United States, such
opportunism is typically curbed through contractual devices. Consider the
doctrine of economic duress that is taught to virtually all first-year contracts
students. In the famous case of Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., a contractor
was forced to buy precision gear components used to produce radar sets for
the Navy at a gouged price, out of necessity to meet its own contractual
obligation. The court concluded that the defendant’s “threat—to stop
deliveries unless the prices were increased—deprived [Plaintiff] of its free
will.”186 The lesson there is that contract law fights against the tendency to
squeeze the buyer.187
But a robust judicial infrastructure that can safeguard economic
arrangements through contracts cannot be taken for granted. In China, a
relatively weak judiciary makes it unlikely that courts will step in to police longterm contracts. As explained by Donald Clarke, “Chinese courts are not
politically powerful and are hence reluctant to take cases involving large sums
of money and powerful defendants.”188

182. Data on file with the author.
183. See, e.g., Keister, supra note 155, at 1711.
184. Dammann, Related, supra note 175, at 218.
185. Id. at 219.
186. Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E.2d 533, 536 (N.Y. 1971).
187. Of course, there are many other factors that may also explain why corporate groups and
intra-group transactions are relatively rare in the United States. U.S. tax laws governing intragroup dividends, for instance, encourage freestanding firms as opposed to corporate pyramid
structures that are common outside of the United States. See Randall Morck, How to Eliminate
Pyramidal Business Groups: The Double Taxation of Intercorporate Dividends and Other Incisive Uses of
Tax Policy, 19 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 135, 135 (2005).
188. Clarke, Corporate Governance in China, supra note 94, at 503; see also Tamar Groswald
Ozery, Minority Public Shareholders in China’s Concentrated Capital Markets—A New Paradigm?, 30
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 19 (2016) (“[T]he relative weakness of the courts and other institutions
and their pronounced reluctance to adjudicate or enforce in such cases, curtails the system’s
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It also bears noting that even if the judiciary gains political power in
China, judges would still face difficulty policing related-party transactions.
Services and parts involved in related-party transactions often have
idiosyncratic features, meaning that “the relevant market price is often not
available.”189 As on-the-ground practitioners explain, the chairperson of a
Chinese company “often own[s] different entities across the supply chain, as
well as real estate interests, that make it hard to determine if a transaction is
truly [at] ‘arms length.’”190 This would make it almost impossible to assess with
accuracy on whether the transaction was “fair.”
Related-party transactions can also be critical to securing capital when
local capital markets are weak or underdeveloped. As Zohar Goshen explains:
“[A] corporation seeking credit may find that, in some circumstances, a loan
taken from its controlling owners is the cheapest option.”191 This is the
concept of “propping up,” a term used to describe instances when a
controlling shareholder uses private resources to boost one of the firms within
her corporate group.192 Propping up is fairly common among Chinese firms
listed in the United States. Thus, for instance, Aurora Mobile Limited, a data
solutions company based in Shenzhen, China, discloses:
As of December 31, 2016 and 2017, we had amounts of RMB5.6
million and RMB5.6 million, respectively, due to Mr. Weidong Luo,
our chief executive officer and chairman of our board of directors,
representing the capital he contributed to fund our operations at
the early stage of our development. Such amounts are interest free.
We fully repaid the outstanding balance to Mr. Luo in April 2018.193
Propping up can especially make sense from the corporate group’s
perspective when funding a particular business helps the firm solidify its
supply chain and potentially exploit its market power.194

ability to restrain controlling shareholders or hold them accountable ex post as well.”).
Transactions between intra-group firms curb this opportunism, while also “avoid[ing] other
common contracting problems resulting from informational asymmetries, long-term contracting
and the like.” Dammann, Related, supra note 175, at 219.
189. Kim, Related, supra note 33, at 292.
190. Drew Bernstein, Caryn G. Schechtman & Robert D. Weber, When U.S. Law Collides
with Chinese Reality, LAW.COM: N.Y. L.J. (Mar. 14, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.law.com/
newyorklawjournal/almID/1202751855447/when-us-law-collides-with-chinese-reality [https://
perma.cc/RJB7-FRU2].
191. Goshen, supra note 22, at 400.
192. Eric Friedman, Simon Johnson & Todd Mitton, Propping and Tunneling, 31 J. COMPAR.
ECON. 732, 732 (2003) (“[U]nder some conditions entrepreneurs prop up their firms, i.e., they
use their private funds to benefit minority shareholders.”).
193. Aurora Mobile Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F) 87 (Apr. 3, 2019).
194. Stephen Yan-Leung Cheung, Lihua Jing, Tong Lu, P. Raghavendra Rau & Aris
Stouraitis, Tunneling and Propping Up: An Analysis of Related Party Transactions by Chinese Listed
Companies, 17 PACIFIC-BASIN FIN. J. 372, 374 (2009). Unsurprisingly, loans among affiliated
companies of Chinese firms listed in the United States are hardly unusual. For instance, Huami,
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This is not to say that self-dealing transactions should be celebrated. The
normative merits of self-dealing transactions are, at best, murky. After all,
controlling shareholders can wield their power to expropriate minority
shareholders by engaging in transactions that enrich themselves.195 For
example, a transaction between a listed firm and a wholly-owned subsidiary
both controlled by an insider “could serve to transfer value to the controller
by . . . setting favorable transfer prices or selling off the listed firm’s assets
cheaply.”196 In its most perverse form, self-dealing is the legalized looting of
minority shareholders.
But the normative desirability of self-dealing transactions (at least from
the standpoint of the firm and its shareholders) depends on the web of
regulatory laws and market conditions. Indeed, self-dealing transactions
under certain conditions can be used “as part of the vertical or horizontal
integration within an enterprise group . . . to achieve performance goals by
reducing transaction costs.”197

a biometric company specializing in smart wearable technology, discloses its elaborate credit
agreements:
We have invested in a number of companies as a strategy to expand our business
partner network, and we extended loans to our investee companies from time to
time to support their operations. We have provided loans to Hefei LianRui
Microelectronics Technology Co., Ltd., or Hefei LianRui, Hangzhou Aqi Vision
Technology Co., Ltd., or Hangzhou Aqi, Xi’an Haidao information Technology Co.,
Ltd., or Xi’an Haidao, Hefei Huaying Xingzhi Fund Partnership, or Hefei Huaying,
and Hangzhou Yunyou Technology Co. Ltd., or Hangzhou Yunyou.
Huami Corp., Annual Report (Form 20-F) 85 (Apr. 12, 2019).
195. See Cheung et al., supra note 194, at 374.
196. Fisman & Wang, supra note 33, at 429.
197. Chen et al., supra note 181, at 287. In many respects, deliberate government policy
further facilitates the existence of the corporate group structure. Li-Wen Lin and Curtis
Milhaupt’s account of networked hierarchy is particularly helpful to understand the extent to
which the Chinese government is intertwined in China’s contemporary state capitalism. As Lin
and Milhaupt explain, “a chief characteristic of the Chinese scheme of industrial organization” is
“vertically integrated corporate groups organized under SASAC, strategically linked to other
business groups—as well as to governmental organs and state institutions, such as universities
—enmeshed in a helical personnel-appointment process of rotations managed jointly by the
Communist Party and SASAC.” Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 155, at 707. Under this system, certain
forms of collaboration that would raise obvious antitrust concerns “have thus far been virtually
exempt from antitrust enforcement.” Id. at 723. Indeed, Chinese antitrust authorities generally
tolerate a host of industries being subject to an oligopolistic market structure, enabling firms to
take advantage of lopsided market power. See Qiang Xiaoji, Baidu, Tencent, Alibaba Forming
Oligopoly on Chinese Internet, CHINA DAILY (Feb. 18, 2011, 5:38 PM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
bizchina/2011-02/18/content_12042514.htm [https://perma.cc/LF7R-DNA3] (describing
oligopolistic market structure of China’s internet, where “Tencent took up 76.56 percent of the
market share of instant messaging . . . Baidu took 72.3 percent of the market shares of search
engines, while Alibaba took up 54.39 percent of the the [sic] B2B business”).
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Inadequacy of Independent Directors

The mere frequency of self-dealing transactions, of course, does not
necessarily render Delaware corporate law impracticable. Recall that selfdealing transactions can be “cleansed” under Delaware law if approved by
independent directors.198 But the availability of independent directors that
can effectively police these transactions cannot be taken for granted.199
While independent directors were formally introduced to the Chinese
legal system in 2001,200 their efficacy is, at best, questionable. This is because
Chinese firms are typically dominated by the firms’ founders (who often
are also the controlling shareholders), and thus directors are not truly
independent.201 To put it bluntly, “independent” directors in China are often
thought to be “rubber stamps for controlling shareholders and corporate
insiders.”202 Indeed, a recent study indicates that “independent directors in
Chinese corporations issued only 0.9% of dissent opinions . . . in board
meetings.”203 This should not surprise anyone working on the ground “[i]n
China . . . , [where] many independent directors have social connections
with corporate insiders, but . . . are not necessarily efficient monitors and
advisors.”204 Given this reality, it is unlikely that Delaware courts will find
appointed “independent” directors in China to be truly independent. This is
particularly true under recent Delaware Supreme Court jurisprudence

198. Tuch, Reassessing Self-Dealing, supra note 164, at 955.
199. Under recent Delaware jurisprudence, directors must physically reside in the principal
place of business of the firm, meaning that Chinese firms must rely on local independent
directors in China even if they incorporate in Delaware. See Transcript of Oral Argument and
Court’s Ruling at 17–18, In re Puda Coal, Inc. S’holders Litig., (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2013) (C.A. No.
6476-CS) (“[I]f you’re going to have a company domiciled for purposes of its relations with its
investors in Delaware and the assets and operations of that company are situated in China that,
in order for you to meet your obligation of good faith, you better have your physical body in
China an awful lot. You better have in place a system of controls to make sure that you know that
you actually own the assets. You better have the language skills to navigate the environment in
which the company is operating.”). Even within the United States, scholars have identified
inadequacies in the current independent-director framework. See, e.g., Nili, supra note 173, at
503; Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 453 (2008).
200. Clarke, Independent Director, supra note 94, at 125.
201. Bernstein et al., supra note 190; Clarke, Independent Director, supra note 94, at 169 (citing
a study conducted by the Shanghai Securities Exchange identifying the “lack of independence
(presumably from management) of the board of directors” as one major problem in Chinese
corporate governance); Virginia Harper Ho, Corporate Governance as Risk Regulation in China: A
Comparative View of Risk Oversight, Risk Management, and Accountability, 3 EUR. J. RISK REG. 463, 469
(2012) (“Notwithstanding reforms to introduce independent directors to corporate boards,
boards do not always function as effective monitors, and controlling shareholders can structure
decision making power so as to effectively usurp the role of the board of directors.” (footnote
omitted)).
202. Sang Yop Kang, The Independent Director System in China: Weaknesses, Dilemmas, and
Potential Silver Linings, 9 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 151, 154 (2017).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 168.
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clarifying that social relationships bear directly on the question of director
independence.205 And, even if integrated into the corporate board of Chinese
firms, it is unclear if “independent” directors will be able to effectively police
harmful self-dealing transactions. For a typical Chinese corporation listed in
the United States, opting into Delaware corporate law will yield protracted
disputes over whether they qualify as “independent,”206 and if not, costly
litigation over the “fairness” of intra-group transactions.
There are also strategic reasons why independent directors may be
undesirable for firms that principally operate in China. First, “independent
directors—even if they are truly independent—often lack expertise, and face
time constraints in understanding significant corporate business policies.”207
Second, business is often done through “social networks in China[, which]
are cumulatively connected in a complicated matrix through regional,
educational and other backgrounds.”208 Therefore, independent directors
may be hostile to the very way business is customarily conducted in China.
This organizational structure helps explain why Chinese firms would
prefer Cayman law over Delaware law. Under the Cayman Islands Companies
Act, even an interested director may vote on self-dealing transactions so
long as the conflict is disclosed to the board209—something prohibited
under Section 144 of the Delaware General Corporation Law.210 The legal
divergence between the two jurisdictions is hardly a secret. As 21Vianet Group
fully discloses in their SEC filings:
Certain corporate governance practices in the Cayman Islands,
which is our home country, are considerably different than the
standards applied to U.S. domestic issuers. . . . We currently follow
our home country practice that . . . does not restrict a company’s
transactions with directors, requiring only that directors exercise a

205. See Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 820 (Del. 2019) (“Although the fact that fellow
directors are social acquaintances who occasionally have dinner or go to common events does
not, in itself, raise a fair inference of non-independence, our law has recognized that deep and
longstanding friendships are meaningful to human beings and that any realistic consideration of
the question of independence must give weight to these important relationships and their natural
effect on the ability of the parties to act impartially toward each other.” (footnote omitted)).
206. Kang, supra note 202, at 154; see also Sandys v. Pincus, 152 A.3d 124, 130 (Del. 2016)
(holding that co-ownership of an airplane with a corporate defendant “is suggestive of the type
of very close personal relationship that, like family ties, one would expect to heavily influence a
human’s ability to exercise impartial judgment”).
207. Kang, supra note 202, at 153.
208. Id. at 154.
209. See Bradley Kruger, Acting as a Director of a Cayman Islands Company, OGIER (Apr. 12,
2020), https://www.ogier.com/publications/acting-as-a-director-of-a-cayman-islands-company
[https://perma.cc/D2T7-42FR].
210. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) (2020) (requiring interested transactions to be
approved “by the affirmative votes of a majority of the disinterested directors”).
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duty of care and owe certain fiduciary duties to the companies for
which they serve . . . .211
Many Chinese firms listed in the United States have expressly memorialized
this understanding in their Articles of Association.212
Firms like Baidu and JD.com thus avoid shareholder litigation over
presumably “benign” self-dealing transactions by avoiding Delaware corporate
law altogether. It is telling that three of the most popular jurisdictions for
Chinese corporations listed in American stock markets—the Cayman Islands,
the British Virgin Islands, and Nevada—practically immunize self-dealing
transactions from challenge.213 It is no wonder that Nevada—which protects
directors and officers even for self-dealing transactions214—has vastly
outperformed Delaware in attracting Chinese firms. Taking a step further
than Nevada, the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands make it
exceedingly difficult to bring shareholder derivative suits altogether.215
*

*

*

Corporations choosing to incorporate in jurisdictions offering lax
corporate law may be a sign of a race for the bottom. In an infamous piece,
211.
212.

21 Vianet Grp., Inc., supra note 148, at 125.
As one prominent offshore law firm explains:

[I]nvariably a company’s articles of association will nowadays provide that, if a
director discloses his or her interest to the board at or before the meeting at which
a particular matter is to be considered, he or she may vote in respect of that matter,
notwithstanding that he is interested in such matter.
Kruger, supra note 209. Thus, for instance, Baidu’s Articles of Association spell out:
No person shall be disqualified from the office of Director or alternate Director or
prevented by such office from contracting with the Company, either as vendor,
purchaser or otherwise, nor shall any such contract or any contract or transaction
entered into by or on behalf of the Company in which any Director or alternate
Director shall be in any way interested be or be liable to be avoided, nor shall any
Director or alternate Director so contracting or being so interested be liable to
account to the Company for any profit realised by any such contract or transaction
by reason of such Director holding office or of the fiduciary relation thereby
established. A Director (or his alternate Director in his absence) shall be at liberty
to vote in respect of any contract or transaction in which he is so interested . . . .
BAIDU.COM, INC., AMENDED AND RESTATED MEMORANDUM OF ASSOCIATION 32 (2005), https://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1329099/000119312505140785/dex31.htm [https://
perma.cc/9Q7J-X8US].
213. Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 8, at 1445–46, 1450 n.231.
214. See Barzuza, Nevada, supra note 32, at 951 (“[D]irectors and officers in Nevada are liable
only for intentional misconduct, fraud, or a knowing violation of law. This may result in no
liability for a number of important categories, including conflicts of interest, self-dealing with the
company, personal benefits, and conscious disregard of duties.”).
215. In both the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands, derivative suits require
permission from the court to proceed and the practical success rate is slim. See Moon, Delaware’s
New Competition, supra note 8, at 1145–46.
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Bill Cary conceptualized competition between states to supply corporate
charters as inducing a “race for the bottom.”216 Extending Cary’s framework,
competition between nation-states may enable the race to go further into
jurisdictions offering liability-free regimes.217 Both legal and finance
professionals have warned that Chinese corporations can exploit American
investors.218 Recently, Matthew Schoenfeld and Professor Jesse Fried have
assessed that investing in Chinese corporations listed in American stock
markets is “extremely risky, at least for American investors.”219 Similarly,
Professor Donald Clarke has assessed that “[i]nvestors should take seriously
the disclosures in the risk factors section of the prospectuses of Chinese
companies to the effect that it will be difficult to hold companies and their
executives accountable under US law.”220
To a certain extent, these accounts are backed up by recent newspaper
headlines and SEC indictments against officers and directors of Chinese
companies.221 Consider ZST Digital Networks, Inc., a firm specializing in
digital and optical network equipment in the Henan Province of China. In
2012, the company failed to comply with a default judgement in Delaware
ordering the company to produce detailed financial and strategic
information.222 Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of
Chancery held the company in contempt of court and went on to issue arrest
warrants for the uncomplying Chinese executives.223 Even Hollywood has
jumped on the bandwagon, producing films including The China Hustle,
depicting collusion between American bankers and Chinese companies to
screw over U.S. investors.224

216. Cary, supra note 54, at 666.
217. See id.; see also Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 8, at 1450 n.231 (discussing
the opportunity “to model the type of domestic companies that are incorporating in foreign
nations”).
218. See, e.g., Jesse M. Fried & Ehud Kamar, China and the Rise of Law-Proof Insiders 2 (Eur.
Corp. Governance Inst., L. Working Paper No. 557/2020, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3740223 [https://perma.cc/A42C-A6MN].
219. Fried & Schoenfeld, supra note 85.
220. Donald Clarke, The Bonding Effect in Cross-Listed Chinese Companies: Is It Real?, in
ENFORCEMENT OF CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW: CHINA AND THE WORLD 88, 99 (Robin Hui
Huang & Nicholas Calcina Howson eds., 2017).
221. See, e.g., Pan Kwan Yuk, Another Chinese Company Gets Charged with Fraud, FIN. TIMES (June
20, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/257ddfa3-a077-39a8-9c15-2907eb42f418 [https://
perma.cc/8VDA-A9LV].
222. See Deutsch v. ZST Digit. Networks, Inc., C.A. No. 8014, 2018 WL 3005822, at *3 (Del.
Ch. June 14, 2018).
223. See Matt Levine, You Can’t Hide from the Corporate Cops, BLOOMBERG OP. (June 21, 2018,
9:56 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-06-21/you-can-t-hide-from-thecorporate-cops [https://perma.cc/359L-476M].
224. Mark Hughes, Review: ‘The China Hustle’ Is the Most Important Film of 2018, FORBES
(Mar. 30, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/markhughes/2018/03/30/reviewthe-china-hustle/?sh=253ad9843357 [https://perma.cc/DQM8-9NU3].
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But the question remains why anyone—particularly sophisticated
institutional investors like BlackRock—would invest in Chinese companies
only to be exploited. After all, we typically assume that investors can fend for
themselves when it comes to buying shares of publicly traded corporations.225
While there are undoubtedly Chinese firms that go offshore because it
makes it easier to defraud American investors, there are legitimate business
reasons why a typical Chinese firm listed in the United States would avoid
Delaware. Institutional investors in the United States thus far have not
(successfully) demanded that Chinese firms incorporate in Delaware.226 They
also have not lobbied these firms to provide for enhanced contractual
safeguards of shareholder rights via corporate charters or bylaws—indicating
that the popularity of the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands has
more to do with corporate governance rules that comport with local market
conditions rather than facilitating fraud.
The next Part turns normative, after collecting broader lessons to be
drawn from Delaware’s international unpopularity.
IV. LESSONS: TERRITORIAL MARKET SEGMENTATION AND THE PERILS
OF EXPORTING DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW
This Part distills lessons from foreign corporations that appear to be unattracted to Delaware corporate law. Section IV.A develops a theoretical
framework that explains how local regulations and market infrastructures
impact the corporate-law preferences of firms. This Section, which builds on
theories developed in the pure domestic context, brings legal theory up to
date to account for the emerging international market for corporate law.
Section IV.B lays out policy prescriptions and counsels against exporting
Delaware corporate law to foreign nations that may have vastly different
market environments than the United States.

225. Cf. Winter, supra note 12, at 256 (assessing that, while corporate managers could
technically choose any state’s corporate law, if that choice was unfavorable to the shareholders’
interest, they would be outperformed, putting the managers’ employment in jeopardy); see also
Andrew F. Tuch, Proxy Advisor Influence in a Comparative Light, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1459, 1464 (2019)
(“In the United States, institutional investors have opportunities annually, and often more
frequently, to vote the shares they hold for their clients . . . . They often engage proxy
advisors—firms such as ISS and Glass Lewis—that provide guidelines, recommendations, and other
information to help investors vote their shares on the various proposals before them.” (footnote
omitted)).
226. To be sure, there have been some notable efforts to dissuade Chinese firms from leaving
Delaware. For instance, Institutional Shareholder Services, a top shareholder advisory firm,
unsuccessfully opposed Sohu’s proposal to redomicile from Delaware to the Cayman Islands,
assessing that “under Cayman Islands rules, director nominations and business proposals are limited
to shareholders holding at least 5 percent of outstanding shares, which could diminish investor
rights” and “[t]he company would also not be required to follow certain Nasdaq standards.” Chen,
supra note 74.
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A. TERRITORIAL MARKET SEGMENTATION: THE ROLE OF LOCAL REGULATIONS
AND MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES ON INCORPORATION CHOICE
A powerful explanation that accounts for Delaware’s unpopularity in the
emerging global market for corporate law is that Delaware corporate law may
not be operationally compatible with foreign market environments, even if we
view shareholder profit maximization as the sole goal of corporations.227 This
lesson has several implications for the future of corporate law theory and
practice.
Territorial market segmentation is the term I offer to capture the whole swath
of local regulations and market dynamics that impact the corporate law
preferences of firms.228 That is, local market environments—shaped by an
array of factors including government policies, regulatory laws, capital
markets, business culture, and judicial infrastructure—affect the corporate
law preferences of firms.229 This theory predicts that firms that operate in
substantially different market environments will prefer different corporate
governance rules, to the extent that firms can shop for corporate law.
This framework departs from the way we currently understand corporate
law preferences of firms.230 The idea that firms may have differentiated taste
for corporate law was originally hinted at by Judge Richard Posner and the
227. This is a contested notion. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production
Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 249 (1999); Afra Afsharipour, Redefining Corporate
Purpose: An International Perspective, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 465, 469 (2017); Kevin V. Tu, Socially
Conscious Corporations and Shareholder Profit, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 121, 126 (2016). For now, I
leave some of the important normative questions aside, but the time will come to give this maxim
the attention it deserves.
228. This framework builds on an extensive body of comparative corporate law literature that
has shown that “successful forms of corporate capitalism do not have identical features around
the world.” Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 155, at 704. As explained by Lin and Milhaupt, “firms
differ systematically in their ownership structures, sources of financing, and the surrounding set
of national legal and market institutions in which they develop.” Id.
229. While cross-border transactions have challenged territorially tethered regulatory laws,
territoriality remains central to how national and sub-national regulatory laws are applied to
firms. In the United States, for example, the presumption against extraterritoriality operates as a
powerful canon that counsels against applying federal statutes to cases that principally involve
transnational fact patterns. See William S. Dodge, The New Presumption Against Extraterritoriality,
133 HARV. L. REV. 1582, 1603–04 (2020); Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67
STAN. L. REV. 1081, 1097–99 (2015). For critiques of how modern courts have applied the
presumption, see Lea Brilmayer, The New Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National Australia Bank,
Legislative Supremacy, and the Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 40 SW.
L. REV. 655, 663–64 (2011); Aaron D. Simowitz, The Extraterritoriality Formalisms, 51 CONN. L. REV.
375, 389 (2019); Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, supra note 120, at 4–5.
230. This framework is also distinct from the way existing scholarship has documented
market segmentation occurring in global capital markets. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the
Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229, 231–32 (2007) (“In overview, highintensity enforcement [in U.S. stock markets] may dissuade some issuers from entering the U.S.
market and, thus, could be responsible for some of the asserted decline in the ‘competitiveness’
of the U.S. capital markets. But, at the same time, other firms are attracted to U.S. markets. In
effect, there is a separating equilibrium as foreign issuers go both ways.”).
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late Professor Kenneth Scott in a well-known book published in 1980.231 The
idea that different bundles of corporate law may appeal to different firms was
also a theoretical building block to Professor Roberta Romano’s influential
“law as a product” thesis advanced in the mid-1980s.232 Since then, the
concept of market segmentation has been expressly developed in Professor
Michal Barzuza’s study of how Nevada carved out a sizable niche of the
American corporate law market.233 Importantly, Nevada does not compete
head-on with Delaware. Instead, Nevada competes by attempting to attract a
different segment of the market—namely, corporations looking for lax rules
friendlier for managers in what Professor Barzuza describes as a “liability free
jurisdiction.”234 Others have extended her theory with a rich body of empirical
research, suggesting that different types of shareholders also impact
corporate law preferences. Professors Ofer Eldar and Lorenzo Magnolfi, for
instance, assess that Nevada appeals to “small firms with low institutional
shareholding.”235
The theory of territorial market segmentation does not disagree with the
market segmentation thesis, but assesses that it is incomplete. It posits that
local market conditions also affect the firm-level preferences of corporate
governance rules. That is, whether a firm principally operates in New York,
California, or all 50 states, does not affect whether the Sherman Act or the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act will govern. It also does
not impact the local judicial infrastructure or capital markets that may
incentivize firms to operate as standalone entities rather than as part of a
corporate group. Whether a company principally operates in China or the
United States, on the other hand, will vastly impact applicable regulatory laws
and the surrounding market environment—and therefore the choice of
corporate law.236

231. See POSNER & SCOTT, supra note 32, at 111 (“Delaware has tailored its law to the needs
of the large public corporation; if states are competing for charter business, wouldn’t one expect
some product specialization? In fact, in recent years, quite a few states have adopted special
statutes or provisions to deal with the special needs of small, closely-held corporations.”).
232. See Romano, Law as a Product, supra note 24, at 226–27; see also ROMANO, GENIUS, supra
note 3, at 1 (arguing that charter competition between states enables firms to “seek the state
whose code best matches their needs so as to minimize their cost of doing business”).
233. Barzuza, Nevada, supra note 32, at 994. According to Professor Barzuza, “[m]arket
segmentation is a multi-step process involving: (1) identification of heterogeneity among
consumers; (2) division of the market into subgroups with similar preferences; and (3) creation
of a product to meet a particular segment’s demand.” Id. at 959.
234. Id. at 947–49. After all, Delaware faces substantial pressure on the demand side to
maintain shareholder-friendly laws, and Nevada does not attempt to emulate Delaware’s
substantive laws. See id. at 960.
235. Ofer Eldar & Lorenzo Magnolfi, Regulatory Competition and the Market for Corporate Law,
12 AM. ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS 60, 62 (2020).
236. More cynically, it could also mean that these firms are trying to maximize the private
benefits of control, rather than maximize firm value. As Professor Coffee explains, firms with
concentrated ownership “often act[] to maximize the private benefits of control for their
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Territorial market segmentation thus helps refine our understanding
about firm preferences of corporate law. The theory takes seriously the idea
that standard “shareholder centric” corporate governance rules espoused by
Delaware may not be operationally compatible with local market conditions
present in many foreign nations. For firms principally operating in markets
like China, even shareholders—who are presumably seeking the highest
returns on their investments—might prefer a set of rules that deviate from
Delaware corporate law. It is thus unsurprising that Chinese firms have
gravitated towards corporate law jurisdictions that more or less accommodate
self-dealing transactions.237
The theory of territorial market segmentation has a number of payoffs.
First, it undermines the idea that corporate law is on the path to global
convergence. In their provocative and widely-cited piece, The End of History for
Corporate Law, Professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman argued two
decades ago that “[t]he basic law of corporate governance . . . has achieved a
high degree of uniformity . . . and continuing convergence toward a single,
standard model is likely.”238 Professors Hansmann and Kraakman support this
assertion by documenting “[t]he triumph of the shareholder-oriented model
of the corporation over its principal competitors.”239 Others, perhaps most
prominently Professor Jack Coffee, have explored the possibility of global
convergence taking place not through local legal reforms, but through
contracts: Foreign corporations may “converge” to American-style corporate
law without local reforms because they can list in an American stock market,
thereby subjecting themselves to functionally similar corporate governance
rules.240

controlling shareholders,” rather than “maximize their share price in the market.” Coffee, Racing
Towards the Top, supra note 15, at 1764. Relatedly, it is also possible that managers of these firms
are trying to maximize growth, rather than shareholder wealth. As Professor Romano explains in
the context of Japanese managers preferring objectives like maximization of growth, “[g]iven the
corporate group setting, in which the most significant shareholders have dual roles as customers,
suppliers, or lenders, such an attitude is also not surprising.” Roberta Romano, A Cautionary Note
on Drawing Lessons from Comparative Corporate Law, 102 YALE L.J. 2021, 2032 (1993).
237. See supra Table 2.
238. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 35, at 439.
239. Id. at 468.
240. Coffee, Future as History, supra note 13, at 650 (“[L]egislation is not the only route to
functional convergence. Although this Article agrees with the path dependency perspective that
formal convergence faces too many obstacles to be predicted, it argues that functional
convergence can be facilitated by a much more feasible and largely voluntary route. That route
runs through the international securities markets and, in particular, involves the growing
migration of foreign firms to the U.S. equity markets.” (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted));
see also Gilson, supra note 143, at 349 (“John Coffee has developed a second example of
convergence by contract . . . . In this case, the contract is the listing agreement executed when a
non-U.S. corporation lists its securities on a U.S. securities exchange, together with those U.S.
securities laws to which the act of listing subjects a foreign corporation.” (footnote omitted)).
Professor Coffee’s groundbreaking work remains important today, but this Article complicates
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The “end of history” thesis, at least in its strong form, has already been
challenged on a number of grounds. Perhaps the most robust line of scholarly
attack has been on the grounds of path dependency: that is, initial patterns of
local political and social institutions may hinder local corporate law reform.
In their majestic work, Professors Mark Roe and Lucian Bebchuk argued that
path dependency driven by the power that various interest groups have in the
process of producing corporate rules will constrain and probably overcome
the competitive forces pushing for corporate convergence.241 Other notable
scholars have extended this framework through rigorous case studies.
Professor Afra Afsharipour, for instance, has studied corporate governance
reform efforts in India to assess “that comprehensive convergence is limited
and that the transmission of ideas from one system to another is highly
complex and difficult, requiring political, social, and institutional changes
that cannot be made easily.”242
Territorial market segmentation provides an alternative (and
complementary) explanation for why global convergence is unlikely to take
place in the near future.243 As long as regulatory laws and market dynamics
impacting the firm remain relatively heterogeneous across national borders,
corporate law preferences may be varied even in a purely Darwinian world of
corporate law enabled by transnational corporate law shopping.244 Corporate
law differentiation, in other words, will likely persist—and for good reason.245

the existing contractarian model by showing that firms have acute preferences for corporate law
distinct from federal securities law.
241. See Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 35, at 131.
242. Afra Afsharipour, Corporate Governance Convergence: Lessons from the Indian Experience, 29
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 335, 339 (2009).
243. The prevailing critiques against convergence tend to assess some form of an inability of
systems to adapt and converge. My account supports the possibility of simple reluctance by
foreign systems. This account is particularly important, as major jurisdictions increasingly allow
firms to shop for the law of any nation. In turn, firms can choose their preferred shareholdercentric corporate law regime without reliance on local corporate law reform.
244. The dominant scholarly account adopts a Darwinian explanation to corporate law. See
Clarke, Independent Director, supra note 94, at 175 (“In Western studies of corporate governance,
the dominant explanation for the current corporate landscape is a Darwinian one: the structures
and institutions we see are presumed to be the efficient ones that survived in the course of
competition with less efficient forms, and the challenge is to explain the source of that
efficiency.”); see also Ruth V. Aguilera & Gregory Jackson, Comparative and International Corporate
Governance, 4 ACAD. MGMT. ANNALS 485, 486 (2010) (assessing that “the current U.S. corporate
governance system” is “frequently seen as the ‘best practice’ model”).
245. This account finds support from an excellent forthcoming work by Tamar Groswald
Ozery, who studies the way political institutions with corporate governance capacities have been
deployed in China. Groswald Ozery develops a “politicized corporate governance” framework to
conclude that “convergence is not inevitable even while development continues . . . thus
suggesting that corporate capitalism is not a sole panacea for capital market development.”
Tamar Groswald Ozery, The Politicization of Corporate Governance—A Viable Alternative?, AM.
J. COMPAR. L. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 7–8), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=3608727 [https://perma.cc/W5KH-JAXM].
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The theory of territorial market segmentation holds some lessons about
our own systems, too. For one, it pushes back against the assessment that
Delaware’s gravitational pull over American corporations is a byproduct of a
collective lawyerly “delusion”246 or is merely self-serving for corporate lawyers
who practice in Delaware.247 While both accounts may have captured morsels
of descriptive reality, I am skeptical that the greed of corporate lawyers and
other entrenched interest groups in Delaware have eroded Delaware’s
domestic competitiveness. Rather, the more plausible explanation is that
corporate law preferences are not uniform for all firms, particularly if we
account for firms that operate in markets that are vastly different from that of
the United States. Delaware will likely remain a powerhouse for corporate law
in the United States, but the state is equally unlikely to be attractive to firms
internationally.
B. AGAINST A “ONE-SIZE-FITS-ALL” PARADIGM IN CORPORATE LAW
The theory of regulatory segmentation dispels, at its core, the idea that a
singular system of corporate law is ideal in all settings. The idea that corporate
governance rules deviating from Delaware corporate law is a sign of defective
corporate governance breaks down under serious intellectual pressure.248 As
Professors Li-Wen Lin and Curtis J. Milhaupt remind us, “the business group,
the form of corporate structure prevalent in ‘bad’ law jurisdictions around
the world, has been the engine of development in countries pursuing a
diverse range of economic strategies over the past half century.” 249
Wilmington’s corporate law empire has been called a lot of things, but it
might be the exact ingredients that made it popular in the United States that
make it difficult for the state to attract foreign corporations.250 The state’s

246. See generally Anderson & Manns, supra note 22 (suggesting that Delaware’s dominance
is due to its past reputation rather than present benefits).
247. See generally Macey & Miller, supra note 55 (exploring how an interest-group theory can
help predict and explain legal rules of corporations chartered in Delaware that have left lawyers
in a dominant position).
248. As Professor Bainbridge observes, “the literature assumes that the U.S. model, towards
which global systems are (or are not) converging, is one of shareholder primacy.” Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the Convergence Debate, 16 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 45, 45
(2002). A growing number of voices have challenged the orthodoxy that self-dealing transactions
are evidence of defective corporate law. See Dan W. Puchniak & Umakanth Varottil, Related Party
Transactions in Commonwealth Asia: Complexity Revealed, in THE LAW AND FINANCE OF RELATED PARTY
TRANSACTIONS 327, 332 (Luca Enriques & Tobias H. Tröger eds., 2019) (“[T]he general
assumption that [related party transactions] per se are evidence of defective corporate
governance and that stricter regulation of [related party transactions] consequently equates to
‘good law’ is erroneous.”).
249. See Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 155, at 749 (footnote omitted).
250. Relatedly, Professor Barzuza has assessed that Delaware’s shareholder-friendly legal
regime makes it difficult to attract American corporations that prefer laxer governance structure.
Barzuza, Nevada, supra note 32, at 941–42. Because Delaware must retain its brand, it would be
difficult for Delaware to offer similar types of “legal regimes” offered by Nevada, the Cayman
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legal regime is costly, and its judicial precedents developed and applied in the
American context may not be ideal for corporations operating abroad that
compete in vastly different market conditions. This is particularly true because
the United States is fairly unique in the world, in terms of the relative lack of
self-dealing transactions and corporate groups.251
We therefore ought to rethink the way in which Delaware corporate law
has been exported to foreign nations.252 According to former Delaware
Supreme Court Justice Randy Holland, Delaware’s international influence is
perhaps best summarized by the statements of Chief Justice In-Jaw Lai of
Taiwan: “Use Delaware in the U.S. as the Model.”253 Particularly in the
aftermaths of liberally exporting American-style free markets and democracy
to developing countries,254 Delaware corporate law has been marketed
internationally in some circles as an important toolkit for economic
development in emerging economies.255
The World Bank has been a leading international organization
spearheading this movement recently. The international organization’s
influential Doing Business Report (DBR), published annually, “has [served
as] a key platform for the American-driven dissemination of global norms
of good corporate governance.”256 Integral to the DBR is the “extent of
conflict of interest regulation index,”257 which presupposes that “good law”
places onerous restrictions on related-party transactions.258 Thus, the report
Islands, and the British Virgin Islands. Cf. Omari Scott Simmons, Branding the Small Wonder:
Delaware’s Dominance and the Market for Corporate Law, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1129, 1138–39 (2008)
(conceptualizing Delaware's legal regime as a brand in the market for corporate charters).
251. See Dammann, Related, supra note 175, at 218.
252. Others have critiqued the fallacies of transplanting Delaware’s substantive corporate
code without America’s discovery regime. See Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 132, at 1485–87.
253. See Randy J. Holland, Delaware’s Business Courts: Litigation Leadership, 34 J. CORP. L. 771,
787 (2009) (quoting In-Jaw Lai: Use Delaware in the U.S. as the Model, COM. TIMES (Taiwan), Nov.
12, 2007).
254. See Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law and
Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1998) (“Marketization and democratization each have been the
site of massive Western legal intervention in the developing world.”).
255. Gilson, supra note 143, at 331 (“The American system then became the apparent end
point of corporate governance evolution, a consensus that appears clearly from the IMF and the
World Bank’s response to the 1997–1998 East Asian financial crisis. In addition to these agencies’
traditional emphasis on macroeconomic matters like government deficit reduction, countries
accepting financial assistance also had to commit to fundamental reform of their corporate
governance system, in the direction of the American model.”).
256. Puchniak & Varottil, supra note 248, at 328.
257. See Protecting Minority Investors Methodology, WORLD BANK, https://www.doingbusiness.
org/en/methodology/protecting-minority-investors [https://perma.cc/3W3G-SZ23].
258. Puchniak & Varottil, supra note 248, at 328. The OECD’s guidelines on good corporate
governance have also drawn from Delaware’s experience. While the non-binding OECD guide
disavows the notion that there is a “single model of good corporate governance,” the guideline
draws heavily from the American (and in particular, Delaware’s) experience. See OECD,
G20/OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 10 (2015). As Shann Turnbull explains,
“the US is seen as the prime role model for other market economies to emulate. . . . [T]he OECD
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gives higher scores “for stricter disclosure requirements for related-party
transactions, for example, in the area of protecting minority investors.”259
These are not just academic exercises. The Republic of the Marshall
Islands, for instance, has literally copied and pasted Delaware’s corporate
code wholesale into its domestic law, statutorily pegging its corporate law to
be updated in accordance with Delaware’s judicial precedents, as well.260
Other nations, including Panama,261 Israel,262 Malaysia,263 and Nevis264 have
enacted corporate law statutes modeled after Delaware. Still other nations,

Corporate Governance Principles follow US practice.” Shann Turnbull, How US and UK Auditing
Practices Became Muddled to Muddle Corporate Governance Principles 6 (May 12, 2005) (working
paper), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=608241 [https://perma.cc/
CQC3-NWA3].
259. THE WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS 2019: TRAINING FOR REFORM 23 (2019), https://
www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/media/Annual-Reports/English/DB
2019-report_web-version.pdf [https://perma.cc/WFJ9-USFS].
260. Business Corporations Act 1990, tit. 52, ch. 1, § 13, https://rmiparliament.org/cms/
images/LEGISLATION/PRINCIPAL/1990/19900091/BusinessCorporationsAct1990_4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HSC4-RLU6] (Marshall Islands) (“This Act shall be applied and construed
to make the laws of the Republic, with respect to the subject matter hereof, uniform with the laws
of the State of Delaware . . . with substantially similar legislative provisions . . . . [T]he nonstatutory law of the State of Delaware . . . is hereby adopted as the law of the Republic . . . .”).
261. Juan Pablo Fabrega Polleri, Panama: Panamanian Corporations: Their Usefulness,
Advantages and Benefits, MONDAQ (Nov. 4, 2016), https://www.mondaq.com/wealth-assetmanagement/482182/panamanian-corporations-their-usefulness-advantages-and-benefits
[https://perma.cc/DT57-W667] (“The law on Panamanian corporations, adopted in 1927, is a
version of the corporation law of the State of Delaware, United States.”).
262. Amir N. Licht, Be Careful What You Wish for: How Progress Engendered Regression in Related
Party Transaction Regulation in Israel, in THE LAW AND FINANCE OF RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS
452, 468 (Luca Enriques & Tobias H. Tröger eds., 2019) (“The rise of American influence on
Israeli company law may be attributed primarily to the enactment of the new Companies Law in
1999 . . . . The 1999 Law came in the wake of a long preparatory work conducted by Uriel
Procaccia and a committee headed by Aharon Barak . . . . Procaccia’s report was heavily influenced
by mid-1980s views in the law and economics literature and by American corporate law.”).
263. See Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp & Mark D. West, The Evolution
of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 791, 801 tbl.1 (2002).
264. MARIO A. MATA, ASSET PROTECTION TECHNIQUES FOR REAL ESTATE OWNERS 605, 649
(2005) (“Nevis adopted its Limited Liability Company Ordinance in 1995. The Act is modeled
after the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act and is considered by many practitioners as the
most modern offshore limited liability legislation of its kind.”).
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including the Netherlands,265 Canada,266 and Japan267 have relied on
Delaware’s judicial precedents to varying degrees.
While Delaware’s century of dominating the American corporate law
market may have taught us important lessons, territorial market segmentation
counsels against foreign nations blindly importing Delaware corporate law. In
many foreign nations, Delaware-style governance rules may be hostile to the
very goals corporate law is designed to accomplish.
V. CONCLUSION
Delaware is celebrated as the crown jewel of American corporate law.
Notwithstanding generations of academic commentators that have critiqued
Delaware corporate law as epitomizing a race for the bottom, an abundant
number of corporate law scholars and practitioners today celebrate Delaware
corporate law as one of America’s prized innovations. There is a degree of
truth to this observation. Today, judges and lawmakers in virtually all other
states look to Delaware for guidance on corporate law, and some foreign
nations have outright copied Delaware’s corporate code.
But this Article suggests that Delaware’s celebrated corporate governance
regime may not have the same type of appeal to foreign corporations
operating in distinct markets and regulatory environments. In doing so, this
Article calls into question the universality of “good” corporate governance
rules espoused by Delaware that were largely developed and refined in the
uniquely-American context. Foreign firms listed in American stock markets
tell a story that corporate law cannot be “one-size-fits-all,” and that even the
most orthodox principles in American corporate law have space to be reconceptualized.
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